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Abstract
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers
who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge
of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a
consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption
or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the
present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We
compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When
some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is
optimal.
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1 Introduction
There has been a remarkable variety across space and time in attempts to alleviate the
consumption of potentially harmful goods. A particularly drastic policy is to prohibit those
goods altogether. This was done in the US in the 1920s with regard to alcohol. However,
Prohibition did not prevent illegal consumption: data suggests that, while consumption first
declined during Prohibition, it increased again after a few years, when the illegal market
had adapted; consumption remained stable after Prohibition ended (Miron and Zwiebel
(1991)). On top of being antiliberal and leading to the criminalization of many people, this
extreme measure only achieved moderate results regarding drinking behavior (Hall (2010)).
A similar case has more recently been made against drug prohibition (Miron and Zwiebel
(1995)). The reason might be that prohibition does not credibly convey information about
the actual hazards of consumption.
Nowadays, a more liberal and more informative approach is to use information nudges.
For example, in many countries, cigarette packages now come with graphic information and
text messages about the potential consequences of smoking. Consumers take those warnings
as sources of information and react to such labels, at least to some extent (Hammond, Fong,
McNeill, Borland, and Cummings (2005)). Similar findings have been reported regarding
alcohol warning labels (MacKinnon, Pentz, and Stacy (1993)) and mandatory calorie posting
in chain restaurants (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011)).
Yet empirical research also documents that consumers do not feel properly addressed.
In a study with adolescents, McCool, Webb, Cameron, and Hoek (2012) report that many
participants questioned whether the graphic labels “portrayed an authentic representation
of the harm caused by smoking. Indeed, the majority perceived graphic warning labels as
‘showing the worst case scenario’ because, for example ‘of course no-one’s going to let their
foot get that bad.’” A targeted and more credible information nudge may have considerably
more potential. For example, warnings against drinking during pregnancy seem to have a
significant impact on those concerned (Hankin, Firestone, Sloan, Ager, Goodman, Sokol,
and Martier (1993)). Yet little is known about the optimal design of information nudges.
This paper aims at filling this gap.
Our formal analysis relies on three ingredients: present-biased preferences, incomplete
information, and Bayesian updating. Let us examine each of these ingredients in turn.
Present-Biased Preferences In our model, a decision maker has to make a sequence of
consumption choices that may have harmful consequences in the future. The decision maker
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is present-biased, in that he puts a disproportionate utility weight on the current period
compared to all later periods in time (Ainslie (1975, 1992), Thaler (1981), Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992)). In this context, his preferred course of action may look as follows:
Cheat today, but abstain from tomorrow on. Under no commitment, however, this course
of action is not feasible: once tomorrow is reached, the same logic applies so that cheating
“today” combined with abstaining from “tomorrow” on looks most appealing—again! As a
consequence, every day becomes a cheating day, and consumption never comes to an end. A
decision maker aware of this misery may decide that quitting now is a smarter choice than
engaging in harmful consumption forever. Yet this choice may never feel appealing enough.
Thus, even though putting an end to harmful consumption now may dominate in terms of
overall utility, consuming forever is the only feasible outcome in intrapersonal equilibrium,
with possibly dreadful consequences.
Incomplete Information The decision maker has initially incomplete information about
the harmful consequences of consumption. This can be because the likelihood of harmful
consequences hinges on his individual risk type, which he need not know with precision.
This could for instance arise if there is heterogeneity in risks across individuals; the decision
maker then only has access to risk statistics at the aggregate population level, but does not
know his exact position in this distribution, because it depends on a variety of risk factors he
lacks the expertise to assess and combine. Alternatively, one could think of a population of
decision makers facing an aggregate risk of unknown magnitude. In both interpretations, we
will assume that a decision maker does not know the actual risk he is facing; yet we assume
that the distribution of risks is common knowledge.
Bayesian Updating In this context, information nudges can help affecting a decision
maker’s incentives by modifying his information structure. Depending on the interpretation
of risk adopted, such nudges can be designed at the individual level, as in a doctor/patient
relationship, or at the population level, as in the case of tobacco or alcohol warnings. To
avoid the negative effects of overstated consumption risks, we require that information nudges
be credible.1 We capture this requirement by assuming that the decision maker, when
exposed to new information about the harmful consequences of consumption, updates his
prior beliefs in a Bayesian way. This generates a tradeoff between the credibility of the
nudge and its efficiency at deterring consumption whenever it is undesirable. Using tools
1Of course, other types of nudges deter consumption via emotional reactions such as disgust (Hammond,
Fong, McDonald, Brown, and Cameron (2004)). We abstract from these different approaches in our analysis
and focus on the impact of information.
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from Bayesian persuasion (Brocas and Carrillo (2007), Rayo and Segal (2010), Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011)), we first characterize the optimal information structure from the
decision maker’s perspective prior to taking any consumption decision. We then compare
this information structure with the optimal information structure from the perspective of a
health authority aiming at minimizing the probability of consumption, as well as with the
optimal information structure from the perspective of a lobbyist aiming at maximizing the
probability of consumption.
We find that there always exists a decision-maker-optimal information structure that
is of cutoff type. In the corresponding persuasion mechanism, the decision maker either
learns that the risk he is facing is high or low, depending on whether it lies above or below
a certain cutoff. The intuition is that cutoff mechanisms are good for efficiency purposes,
because consumption eventually takes place only when the risk is low enough, and that
they also have good incentive properties, because, under no commitment, abstention is
incentive-compatible only when the risk is perceived by the decision maker to be high enough.
When there is heterogeneity in individual risk types, these signals can be interpreted as
recommendations warning against consumption for high-risk individuals within the target
group of the information nudge.2 When the risk is an aggregate one, credible information
about the hazards of consumption is conveyed to the whole population. In either case,
finding the optimal information structure is easy in the sense that it requires pinning down
one single parameter. What makes it challenging is that the degree of self-control is crucial
for the optimal design of the information structure.
The optimal cutoff structure outperforms perfect transparency because, via pooling, more
types may actually find the strength to abstain from consuming once they have learned that
they are of high risk. This contrasts with a decision maker with no bias for the present,
for whom perfect transparency would be optimal (Blackwell (1953)). By tightening the
target group, more drastic information can be credibly communicated, thereby counteracting
impulses from the decision maker’s bias for the present. Indeed, such tightening may explain
why warnings against alcohol work best when they are targeted at the most vulnerable
groups, such as pregnant women. Of course, in practice, many more types should better
abstain (Gutjahr, Gmel, and Rehm (2001), Shield, Parry, and Rehm (2014)). Yet our
analysis suggests that it may be optimal to warn only high-risk types in order to deter at
least them successfully, sacrificing types of lower but still significant risk who will be trapped
2If the distribution of types has atoms, we find that the recommendation to the marginal risk type may
involve randomization.
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in harmful consumption. Key to this logic is that, except possibly for marginal types, the
optimal information structure is coarse: it is more efficient to shield the maximum mass of
types away from consumption by issuing a straight recommendation to abstain, rather than
to issue mixed messages that would only partially protect inframarginal types.
The cutoff structure of optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanisms carries over
when one changes the objective function to a health authority’s or a lobbyist’s. Yet, of
course, the cutoffs are chosen differently. While the health authority prefers to make as
many consumers as possible shy away from harmful consumption, the lobbyist prefers to
lower willpower in as many consumers as possible by convincing them that the risk is not
that high. In the latter case, many consumers who would wish for an information nudge that
helped them abstaining, are instead trapped in harmful consumption. Naturally, the lobbyist
chooses the cutoff of the persuasion mechanism such that as few consumers as possible receive
a convincing signal to abstain, while the health authority does exactly the opposite. A policy
maker who would not take consumers’ self-control problems into consideration may even
misinterpret information structures implemented by a lobbyist as health-concerned, when,
indeed, the target group for a warning label may be chosen deliberately broadly in order to
reduce the impact of the nudge.
In all three optimization problems, the possibilities for designing effective persuasion
mechanisms are limited by incentive constraints. Thus the signal of being a high risk in
the target group must be alarming enough to induce the decision maker to abstain. From
a liberal perspective, it would be ideal to choose the corresponding cutoff in the persuasion
mechanism in such a way that consumption is recommended if and only if it involves no
harm. Yet, under weak conditions on the distribution of risks, this mechanism is incentive-
compatible if and only if the decision maker’s bias for the present is low enough. In all
other cases, harmful consumption takes place with positive probability in equilibrium, and
the decision-maker-optimal information nudge coincides with the health-authority-optimal
one. We also show that a positive shift of the distribution of types in the hazard-rate order
reduces the probability of consuming, reflecting that it is both more desirable and easier for
the mechanism designer to discourage consumption. Interestingly, while a more severe bias
for the present intuitively increases the probability that consumption takes place, it need
not increase the probability that harmful consumption takes place.
Levels of self-control vary across consumers (Mischel (2014), Sutter, Kocher, Gla¨tzle-
Ru¨tzler, and Trautmann (2013)). For example, consumers with high self-control differ from
consumers with low self-control when it comes to food choice, as has been shown in a study on
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the potential impact of product labeling on health (Koenigstorfer, Groeppel-Klein, Kamm
(2014)). Therefore, in an extension, we analyze the case in which decision makers may
have high or low self-control. We find that in many cases, both types of decision makers
can be optimally informed via the same information structure, which turns out to take the
form of a traffic-light nudge. While the strongest, “red” warning signal is drastic enough
to make both decision makers with high and with low self-control abstain, the intermediate
“yellow” warning convinces at least decision makers with high self-control to end harmful
consumption. This discrimination property may be a reason why traffic-light nudges are
one if not the most frequently used nonnumerical information structure, in addition to their
potential saliency.3
Related Literature
Our paper lies at the intersection of three strands of literature. First, our work is related to
the literature on present-biased preferences and information acquisition pioneered by Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2002); specifically, we take the basic model of
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) as our starting point. However, while the literature has so far
emphasized situations in which present-biased decision makers manipulate the information-
acquisition or the information-storing processes, we characterize information structures that
are optimal, given a decision maker’s bias for the present, from different perspectives. While
the basic insight remains that gathering no information may outperform full transparency,
our analysis demonstrates that an intermediate information structure is best, and can be
interpreted as an information nudge acting as a credible warning signal to a specific target
group. This solves two problems that may appear when the task of gathering information
is performed by the decision maker himself. The first is the multiplicity of equilibria arising
from the difficulty to coordinate one’s selves on an intrapersonal equilibrium. The second
is that gathering information oneself creates an additional risk by making different pieces
of information available only sequentially; as a result, some types may end up trapped in
harmful consumption, whereas they would completely abstain if they were instead exposed
to the coarser decision-maker-optimal information nudge.
Second, the information-design problem we study connects our paper to the recent and
very active literature on Bayesian persuasion initiated by the seminal papers of Brocas and
Carrillo (2007), Rayo and Segal (2010), and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011); see Kolotilin,
Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk, and Li (2017) for a recent contribution with many references.
3Evidence on the latter is mixed, see VanEpps, Downs, and Loewenstein (2016).
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What sets our paper apart from most of this literature is that our focus is on frictions in
information demand that arise from intrapersonal, psychological conflicts rather than from
sender-receiver conflicts of interest. Depending on the mechanism designer’s objective, the
optimal persuasion mechanism varies drastically. Our paper thereby contributes to a small
but growing literature on the optimal disclosure of information to agents with psychological
preferences. Lipnowski and Mathevet (2018) show that a tempted agent in the sense of Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001) does not want to know what he is missing, and thus an optimal
disclosure mechanism should limit his information about the value of his preferred choice, so
as to reduce the cost of self-control. Schweizer and Szech (2018) study the optimal revelation
of life-changing information, such as that provided by a medical test, to a patient with
anticipatory utility. Closer to Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), Habibi (2017) studies feedback
mechanisms in a setting where a benevolent principal motivates an agent with present-biased
preferences to exert unobservable effort by providing him with feedback. Different from the
optimal persuasion mechanisms that we construct, the feedback mechanisms studied by
Habibi (2017) are based on a noisy signal that depends on both the agent’s type and effort,
thus providing a moral-hazard counterpart to our analysis.
Popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), the literature on nudging is growing fast
and into multiple directions, with remarkable success also on a political level. Research on
nudging has informed policy making in various countries, such as in the US, UK, Australia,
Germany, and Japan. Also the UN, the OECD, and the World Bank have set up nudging
units. While contributions such as Benkert and Netzer (2018) focus on nudging in the sense
of influencing the framing of decision problems, our focus is on nudges in the form of an
optimized release of information, so called information nudges.4 Such nudges in the form of
warning signals or labels have already received much attention in previous decades, notably in
the marketing literature; see Argo and Main (2004) for an overview. We address the design
of credible information nudges for populations of heterogeneous decision makers who are
present-biased, and compare optimal information nudges from different policy perspectives.
While the optimal nudge can always be represented as a warning signal to a target group, the
size of the target group and the according signal can vary drastically according to the political
goal. Policy makers unaware of or underestimating consumers’ self-control problems risk to
implement an information nudge that completely misses its goal. It may even maximize
consumption when minimizing consumption is intended.
4Coffman, Featherstone, and Kessler (2015) study information nudges assuming agents have mean-
variance preferences. They focus on the comparative statics of agents’ decisions in reaction to different
nudges. In contrast, our focus is on characterizing optimal information nudges.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes
optimal information disclosure. Section 4 illustrates our findings in the polar cases of binary
and nonatomic distributions of types. Section 5 considers alternative objective functions.
Section 6 studies the case of a mixed population of agents, in which some suffer from more
severe self-control problems than others. Section 7 concludes. Proofs not given in the text
can be found in the Online Appendix.
2 The Model
As in Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), we focus on a time-inconsistent decision maker (he) who
makes sequential consumption decisions under no commitment. Consumption is enjoyable
in the short term but, depending on the decision maker’s type, may be quite harmful in the
long term. The novelty of the model is that the decision maker’s information about his type
is optimized by a mechanism designer (she).
2.1 Actions and Payoffs
The decision maker lives at dates 0, 1, 2, and 3. At dates τ = 0, 1, he can consume, xτ = 1,
or abstain, xτ = 0. Consuming at any date τ increases current utility by 1 but comes with
probability θ at a cost C, incurred at date τ + 2. Following Phelps and Pollak (1968) and
Laibson (1997), the decision maker discounts future payoffs according to a quasi-hyperbolic
discount function with parameters β and δ. That is, his vNM utility functions at dates 0
and 1 are given by
U0(x0, x1, θ) = x0(1− βδ2θC) + x1βδ(1− δ2θC), (1)
U1(x0, x1, θ) = −x0βδθC + x1(1− βδ2θC), (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time-inconsistency parameter capturing the bias for the present
relative to the future, while δ ∈ (0, 1] is the usual per-period discount factor. As β < 1,
the decision maker at date 1 puts, relatively to his utility from consuming, less weight on
the harm his consuming might cause at date 3 than he does at date 0. We assume that
βδ2C > 1, so that the decision maker would always abstain if he believed that the cost C
were incurred with probability 1 upon consuming.
2.2 Information and Strategies
The prior beliefs of the decision maker about θ are represented by a distribution P with
cumulative distribution function F over [0, 1]. We denote by θ and θ the infimum and the
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supremum of the support Θ of P, respectively.
Before making his first consumption decision at date 0, the decision maker is exposed
to additional information about θ. This information is distilled by a mechanism designer
who knows the value of θ and can commit to a persuasion mechanism issuing messages
conditional on that value. The decision maker then updates his beliefs about θ in a Bayesian
way whenever that is possible.
As in Strotz (1956), however, the decision maker is unable to commit to a course of
action contingent on his updated beliefs. This restriction is binding, because the preferences
induced by (1)–(2) along with these beliefs are time-inconsistent as β < 1. Following Peleg
and Yaari (1973), the date-0 and date-1 selves of the decision maker act as independent
decision units. The decision maker is sophisticated, so that his behavior is described by a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the resulting intrapersonal game.
In most of our analysis, the mechanism designer is benevolent in that her interests are
aligned with those of the decision maker at date 0. Alternative objective functions for the
mechanism designer are considered in Section 5.
2.3 Applications
Our model applies to situations in which a mechanism designer can determine how much
information she wants to give out regarding a risk type θ. She can pool information by
issuing a coarse signal. Yet she need to stick to the truth: that is, she cannot fool Bayesian
decision makers by systematically lying to them. Depending on the application, the risk
type may be that of a product a decision maker can choose, a characteristic of the decision
maker himself, or a combination of the two.
In the first case, information structures are typically identical for a whole population.
Think, for example, of information nudges on food and beverages in a supermarket, indicating
how healthy a specific choice would be. If the information nudge is printed on the item itself,
the mechanism designer decides if she wants to disclose the risk type θ of a product, or if she
prefers to pool information about different products. For example, she could decide whether
a snack is labeled as a healthy, green-light item or as an unhealthy, red-light item. More
detailed information can be provided by a traffic-light nudge.
In the second case, the mechanism designer may be able to individually address different
consumers, and thereby make use of more personalized signals. An example is information
nudging in a supermarket via smart glasses or smartphones. Another case in point is medical
advice. A doctor or a medical agency may have superior information about a patient’s risk
8
type, and optimize the way it is communicated in order to affect his behavior.5 In the latter
case, the risk type θ is an individual characteristic of the patient. The doctor can disclose
the patient’s risk type perfectly, but she could also tell him that he belongs to a group of
smaller or larger risk.
A key point in that respect is that, even if a decision maker has some private information,
he may lack the ability to translate it into his individual risk type θ. This is essentially
equivalent to having no private information at all, and, hence, room for information design
opens up. For example, consider a decision maker deciding between consuming now or saving
towards retirement. The probability θ then corresponds to his individual survival probability.
Assume that initially, the decision maker only has access to survival probabilities at the
aggregate population level. Then, although he may possess some information about his age,
socioeconomic status, health and other factors, he need not know how to combine these
factors to compute his individual survival probability.6 The mechanism designer has access
to the relevant computation model and can offer personalized information to the decision
maker. Again, she may decide to pool risk types.
2.4 The Intrapersonal Game
As a preliminary step, we focus on the intrapersonal game played by the decision maker’s
date-0 and date-1 selves following the issue of some message by the mechanism designer.
Owing to the binary character of consumption decisions and to the linearity of utilities in θ,
equilibrium behavior in this intrapersonal game only depends on the decision maker’s mean
posterior belief θˆ about θ following this message. Letting
ta ≡ 1
βδ2C
∈ (0, 1), (3)
our first result is a direct consequence of (1)–(2).
Lemma 1 Given a mean posterior belief θˆ about θ, the intrapersonal game has a unique
efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the decision maker’s date-0 and date-1 selves
both consume if θˆ < ta and both abstain if θˆ ≥ ta.
Observe from (1) that, if βta < θˆ < ta, then the decision maker at date 0 would be
strictly better off consuming at date 0 and abstaining at date 1. However, there is no way
5For economic studies in this context, see, for instance, Caplin and Leahy (2004), Ko¨szegi (2003), and
Schweizer and Szech (2018).
6As a stark example, Hurwitz and Sade (2017) find that, compared to nonsmokers, smokers more rarely
prefer the lump-sum option when life insurance money is paid out; actually, they do not think that they
have a shorter life expectancy than nonsmokers either.
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he can reach this outcome under no commitment. Notice also that there is a discontinuity
in the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff at θˆ = ta. Indeed, letting
th ≡ 1 + βδ
1 + δ
ta ∈ (0, ta), (4)
if th < θˆ < ta, then the decision maker at date 0 would be strictly better off abstaining at
both dates than consuming at both dates, and the more so, the closer θˆ is to ta. Yet, under
no commitment, he cannot help doing so; we then say that harmful consumption takes place
in equilibrium. The resulting discontinuity in the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff
arises from his bias for the present: in the limiting case β = 1, the gap between th and
ta vanishes, and the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff is continuous in θˆ; indeed,
his payoff is then convex in θˆ, reflecting that the value of information for a time-consistent
decision maker is always nonnegative.
The equilibrium outcome described in Lemma 1 is unique if θˆ 6= ta. If θˆ = ta, then both
the date-0 and the date-1 selves are indifferent between consuming and abstaining, whereas
the date-0 self strictly prefers that the date-1 self abstains, and reciprocally. Because the
date-0 self can do nothing to influence the behavior of the date-1 self, and reciprocally,
there is a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibria in which both the date-0 and the date-
1 self abstain with arbitrary probabilities in [0, 1]; yet, according to (1)–(2), the efficient
equilibrium arises when they both abstain with probability 1. We focus on this equilibrium
for three reasons.
1. First, as our goal is to characterize the best persuasion mechanism from the perspective
of the decision maker at date 0, it is natural to select the continuation equilibrium that
maximizes the payoff of the date-0 self, leaving the date-1 self indifferent.
2. Second, and more subtly, mean posterior beliefs θˆ equal to the cutoff ta will play a key
role in our analysis, and it is crucial for the existence of optimal persuasion mechanisms
that the continuation equilibrium given such beliefs be efficient.
3. Third, no matter the selected continuation equilibrium, there exists for each ε > 0
an ε-optimal persuasion mechanism that induces posterior beliefs such that the above
tie-breaking issue never arises.
For these reasons, we disregard equilibria of the intrapersonal game other than the efficient
one and proceed as if the decision maker’s behavior given any mean posterior belief about θ
were uniquely determined. Figure 1 below illustrates the resulting decision maker’s date-0
equilibrium payoff as a function of θˆ.
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Figure 1: The decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff.
3 Optimal Information Disclosure
3.1 Suboptimality of Full Information Revelation
If the decision maker had no bias for the present or could commit to a course of action, full
information would be optimal from the perspective of the decision maker at date 0 (Blackwell
(1953)). As shown by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), however, this is no longer the case if
he suffers from a self-control problem. Intuitively, this follows from the nonconvexity of his
equilibrium payoff as a function of his mean posterior belief, as illustrated in Figure 1. To
see this point more formally, suppose
E[θ] ≥ ta and th < E[θ |θ < ta] < ta.
The first inequality implies that, if the decision maker stayed with his prior, then he would
abstain at both dates and thus obtain a zero payoff. Together with (1) and (3)–(4), the
second inequality implies
E[U0(1, 1, θ) |θ < ta] < 0.
Hence, if the decision maker were to learn that θ < ta, then he would on average derive a
negative payoff from consuming at both dates, an outcome which, according to Lemma 1,
he could not prevent from happening under no commitment. Because learning that θ ≥ ta
would in any case not affect his behavior relative to his prior, the decision maker thus strictly
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prefers to stay with his prior and abstain at both dates, rather than learning the value of θ
and possibly getting trapped in harmful consumption. Thus full transparency can destroy
beneficial beliefs that help him overcome temptation.
3.2 Persuasion Mechanisms
The above argument shows that the value of becoming perfectly informed relative to staying
ignorant can be negative from the perspective of the decision maker at date 0. However, this
comparison is extreme, and does not shed light on the date-0 optimal information structure.
We now tackle this issue, building on the Bayesian-persuasion models of Brocas and Carrillo
(2007), Rayo and Segal (2010), and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
Following Aumann (1964), there is no loss of generality in focusing on measurable direct
persuasion mechanisms x : Θ×Ω→ {0, 1} issuing, for any type θ ∈ Θ and for any element ω
of some sample space Ω, a recommendation x(θ, ω) to abstain (0) or to consume (1) at dates
0 and 1.7 As in Aumann (1964), we can take Ω to be [0, 1], endowed with Lebesgue measure
λ over the Borel sets. To any measurable direct persuasion mechanism x : Θ × Ω → {0, 1}
corresponds a measurable mapping pi : Θ→ [0, 1] that associates to each θ ∈ Θ a probability
pi(θ) = λ[{ω ∈ Ω : x(θ, ω) = 1}] (5)
of issuing a recommendation to consume at dates 0 and 1. Conversely, it follows from
Aumann (1964, Lemma F) that, for any measurable mapping pi : Θ → [0, 1], there exists a
measurable direct persuasion mechanism x : Θ×Ω→ {0, 1} such that (5) holds for all θ ∈ Θ.
In line with Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk, and Li (2017), we will mostly work with
this equivalent and more convenient probabilistic representation of persuasion mechanisms,
but we will occasionally rely on the original formulation.
3.3 Incentive Compatibility and Optimality
An important difference between our setting and standard models of Bayesian persuasion
is that the decision maker cannot implement an optimal course of action conditional on his
information; rather, his behavior results from a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game
played by his date-0 and date-1 selves. In particular, abstaining is not a default option
for the decision maker, because there are information states in which he would be strictly
better off abstaining but cannot help consuming. As a result, we cannot write his incentive-
compatibility constraints in the usual way.
7No other recommendation would be followed by the decision maker, because his equilibrium behavior in
any information state is uniquely determined, in the sense explained in Section 2.4.
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As the decision maker has no private information, we just need to focus on his willingness
to comply with the recommendations made to him by the mechanism designer. Consider first
a mechanism pi under which both the recommendations to consume and to abstain are sent
with positive probability, which allows for straightforward applications of Bayes’ rule. By
Lemma 1, complying with the recommendation to consume is consistent with a continuation
equilibrium if and only if E[θ |x(θ, ω) = 1] < ta, that is,
E[θpi(θ)]
E[pi(θ)]
< ta. (6)
Similarly, complying with the recommendation to abstain is consistent with a continuation
equilibrium if and only if E[θ |x(θ, ω) = 0] ≥ ta, that is,
E[θ[1− pi(θ)]]
E[1− pi(θ)] ≥ t
a. (7)
More generally, the left-hand side of constraint (6) is not well defined if pi = 0 P-almost
surely, and similarly the left-hand side of constraint (7) is not well defined if pi = 1 P-almost
surely. We adopt the convention that the undefined constraint is then emptily satisfied. A
mechanism pi is incentive-compatible if it satisfies (6)–(7).
Given the expression (1) for U0(1, 1, θ), the optimal-design problem can then, up to a
multiplicative constant (1 + δ)/ta, be formulated as
max{thE[pi(θ)]− E[θpi(θ)] : pi is incentive-compatible}. (8)
Observe that the objective function in (8) as well as the constraints (6)–(7) are all linear in
pi, which greatly simplifies the analysis. It is worth noticing that there is something slightly
unusual about problem (8), namely, that the inequality in (6) is strict. This, again, reflects
the fact that the behavior of the decision maker results from the equilibrium of a game, and
not from a standard optimization problem.
3.4 A Characterization of Optimal Persuasion Mechanisms
We now characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms. This requires very little structure on
the decision maker’s prior beliefs: the distribution P may be discrete, continuous, or mixed.
The only restriction we impose is that the support Θ of P be sufficiently spread out.
Assumption 1 P[θ ≤ th] > 0 and P[θ > ta] > 0.
Because th < ta, this, in particular, implies θ < ta < θ.
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3.4.1 Cutoff Mechanisms
A cutoff mechanism recommends consuming (abstaining) if θ is below (above) a cutoff, with
possible randomization between the two recommendations at the cutoff. Formally,
pi(θ) = 1{θ<t} + a1{θ=t}
for some pair (t, a) ∈ Θ×[0, 1]. The first step of our characterization consists in showing that
there is no loss of generality in focusing on such mechanisms. The intuition is that cutoff
mechanisms are good for efficiency purposes, because they recommend consuming for values
of θ such that consumption is the most valued by the decision maker, and that they also
have good incentive properties, because they recommend abstaining when the news about θ
is the most alarming.
To see why, we first restrict attention to the mechanisms pi that recommend consuming
with some given probability γ ∈ [0, 1], that is, E[pi(θ)] = γ. Let us momentarily abstract
from incentive considerations and consider, among these mechanisms, one that maximizes
the objective in (8) or, equivalently, that solves
min{E [θpi(θ)] : E [pi(θ)] = γ}. (9)
That is, subject to the constraint that consuming be recommended with probability γ, we
want to find a mechanism that minimizes the expected harm from consumption. Given this
objective, it is optimal to concentrate the mass γ of consumption recommendations on small
values of θ. If the distribution P is nonatomic, then a solution to (9) takes the value 1 in
an interval starting at zero until enough probability mass has accumulated, that is, until
the γ-quantile of F is reached, after which it takes the value 0. If P has atoms, then the
γ-quantile of F may well lie within an atom; in that case, a solution to (9) may necessitate
randomization, but only at this atom. Formally, the following result holds.
Lemma 2 The unique solution to (9) is, up to a P-null set, the cutoff mechanism
pi∗γ(θ) = 1{θ<tγ} +
γ − F (t−γ )
F (tγ)− F (t−γ )
1{θ=tγ} (10)
for tγ ≡ inf {θ : F (θ) > γ}, with 00 = 1 and inf ∅ =∞ by convention.
If the distribution P is nonatomic, then the second term on the right-hand side of (10)
is irrelevant. Conversely, if this term is positive, then tγ is an atom of P and the mechanism
pi∗γ involves randomization at tγ unless γ ∈ {F (t−γ ), F (tγ)}.
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Returning to incentive considerations, observe that if some mechanism pi such that
E[pi(θ)] = γ is incentive-compatible, then so is pi∗γ. This is clear if γ ∈ (0, 1), for pi∗γ minimizes
the left-hand side of (6) and maximizes the left-hand side of (7) among the mechanisms pi
such that E[pi(θ)] = γ. This is also trivially true if γ ∈ {0, 1}, for then pi = pi∗γ up to a P-null
set. Because, by Lemma 2, pi∗γ uniquely minimizes the expected harm from consumption
among the mechanisms pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ, this shows that we can confine ourselves
to the class of incentive-compatible cutoff mechanisms.
From a practical viewpoint, what it needs in order to implement a given cutoff mechanism
is the identification of the target group that will receive an effective warning to abstain. Our
analysis shows that the target group will always be coherent. We now determine the optimal
target group for an effective information nudge.
3.4.2 Optimization
The cutoff mechanism pi∗γ is incentive-compatible if
E[θpi∗γ(θ)]
E[pi∗γ(θ)]
< ta, (11)
E[θ[1− pi∗γ(θ)]]
E[1− pi∗γ(θ)]
≥ ta, (12)
with the same convention as for (6)–(7) if γ ∈ {0, 1}. The optimal-design problem (8) can
then be restated as
max{thE[pi∗γ(θ)]− E[θpi∗γ(θ)] : γ satisfies (11)–(12)}. (13)
We now provide an explicit characterization of optimal persuasion mechanisms, proving in
particular that there always exists a solution to (13).
The Unconstrained-Optimal Mechanism To characterize the solution to (13), let us
again momentarily abstract from incentive considerations and consider, among all values
of γ ∈ [0, 1], the largest one that maximizes the objective in (13). The corresponding
unconstrained-optimal mechanism is the indicator function of the range where the net benefit
th − θ from consuming is nonnegative,
pi∗γu(θ) = 1{θ≤th},
so that γu = F (th) > 0. In particular, pi∗γu does not involve randomization.
8
8If P [θ = th] > 0, there exists a continuum of unconstrained-optimal cutoff mechanisms indexed by
γ ∈ [F (th−), F (th)]. We choose the largest one because it is most likely to satisfy constraint (12).
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If pi∗γu satisfies (11)–(12), then it is also incentive-compatible and, therefore, solves the
initial optimal-design problem (8). Under Assumption 1, this amounts to
E[θ |θ ≤ th] < ta, (14)
E[θ |θ > th] ≥ ta. (15)
Because th < ta, (14) is automatically satisfied. Hence the following result holds.
Proposition 1 If (15) holds, then the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism
is the unconstrained-optimal mechanism pi∗γu.
Harmful Consumption If (15) does not hold, then the unconstrained-optimal mechanism
pi∗γu is no longer incentive-compatible. This implies that harmful consumption can no longer
be avoided for all values of θ > th or, equivalently, that consuming is optimally recommended
with probability γc > γu in the constrained-optimal mechanism. Because the net benefit
th − θ from consuming only switches sign once, the objective in (13) is first nondecreasing
and then nonincreasing in γ. It is then optimal to have γc as close as possible to γu, while
preserving (12). The following result thus holds.
Proposition 2 If (15) does not hold, then the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion
mechanism is pi∗γc , where
E[θ[1− pi∗γc(θ)]]
E[1− pi∗γc(θ)]
= ta (16)
implicitly defines the probability γc of consuming.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on two observations. First, when γ increases from 0
to 1, the left-hand side of (12) strictly and continuously increases from E[θ] to θ. Now,
E[θ] < E[θ |θ > th] < ta if (15) does not hold, while θ > ta under Assumption 1. Thus there
exists a single value of γ such that the incentive constraint (12) following the recommendation
to abstain is just satisfied as an equality, that is, (16) holds. Second, the resulting cutoff
mechanism pi∗γc also satisfies the incentive constraint (11) following the recommendation
to consume, for the corresponding mean posterior belief about θ is below E[θ] and thus,
a fortiori, below ta if (15) does not hold. Thus our candidate optimal mechanism pi∗γc is
incentive-compatible, which achieves the characterization.
The key insight of Proposition 2 is that, following the recommendation to abstain, the
decision maker is actually on the verge of falling into the harmful-consumption trap, as his
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mean posterior belief about θ is just at the critical level ta and is thus just high enough to
induce him to abstain. This reflects that the probability 1− γc of issuing a recommendation
to abstain is chosen in the mechanism pi∗γc to alarm the decision maker in an optimal way:
any higher value would undermine the credibility of the mechanism, whereas any lower value
would make the recommendation to abstain inefficiently alarming. An optimal balance is
thus achieved between the credibility and the efficiency of the mechanism.
Finally, we give a more explicit characterization of γc in the case where (15) does not
hold. If the equation
E[θ |θ > t] = ta (17)
has a solution t = tc, then γc = F (tc) and pi∗γc = 1{θ≤tc}. If P has atoms, however, then
such a solution need not exist because the mapping t 7→ E[θ | θ > t] is discontinuous at
the atoms of P. In that case, the optimal incentive-compatible mechanism may necessitate
randomization to achieve an equality in (12). Let us then define tc as the supremum of the
set of cutoffs that are too small to satisfy (17),
tc ≡ sup{t ∈ [0, ta] : E[θ |θ > t] < ta}, (18)
which is well defined under Assumption 1. Because E[θ | θ > t] is right-continuous in t, it
follows that either (17) is satisfied by tc or (17) has no solution. In the latter case, we have
P[θ = tc] > 0, E[θ |θ ≥ tc] ≤ ta, and E[θ |θ > tc] > ta. If the second of these inequalities is
an equality, then it is optimal to recommend to abstain for sure at θ = tc and pi∗γc = 1{θ<tc}.
If this inequality is strict, recommending to abstain for sure at θ = tc would undermine the
credibility of the mechanism, while recommending to consume for sure at θ = tc would make
the recommendation to abstain inefficiently alarming. Then γc is implicitly defined by (10)
and (16) with tγc = inf {θ : F (θ) > γc} = tc, reflecting how randomization allows us to
interpolate through possible discontinuities of F .
4 Illustrations
We now illustrate our findings in the polar cases of binary and nonatomic distributions.
We pay particular attention to the comparative statics of the optimal incentive-compatible
persuasion mechanism with respect to changes in the distribution of types and the severity
of the decision maker’s bias for the present; one key question, notably, is how such changes
affect the probability of consuming, and to which extent this is harmful from the decision
maker’s perspective at date 0.
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4.1 The Binary Case
Suppose first that θ can only take two values θ and θ such that th < θ < ta and θ > ta.9
Hence, according to Lemma 1, the decision maker consumes at both dates and obtains a
negative payoff if θ is revealed to be θ, and abstains at both dates and obtains a zero payoff if
θ is revealed to be θ. To characterize the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism
in this binary case, we can use Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) standard concavification
argument, working directly in terms of the prior belief p = P[θ = θ] as in Aumann and
Maschler (1995). Letting
pa ≡ θ − t
a
θ − θ ∈ (0, 1), (19)
the date-0 expected payoff of the decision maker is, up to a multiplicative constant (1+δ)/ta,
V0(p) ≡ [th − pθ − (1− p)θ]1{p>pa},
which is negative for p > pa; notice the downward discontinuity of V0 at p
a, reflecting the
discontinuity in the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff at θˆ = paθ + (1− pa)θ = ta.
The concavification cav V0 of V0 coincides with V0 over [0, p
a], where it is flat and equal to
zero, and is affine and decreasing over (pa, 1]. Figure 2 below illustrates this construction.
-
p1pa
r
6
V0, cav V0
th − ta
th − θ
b
Figure 2: Concavifying the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff.
Two regimes then emerge. When p ≤ pa, that is, when the decision maker would abstain
9The first of these two inequalities is not consistent with the first half of Assumption 1. However, a
careful reading of Section 3.4 reveals that we only used the latter when discussing the unconstrained-optimal
mechanism, which is not required in the present binary case.
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absent further information, there is no reason to disclose such information, as doing so can
never benefit the decision maker and may actually hurt him. The unconstrained-optimal
mechanism is incentive-compatible and prescribes that no information be disclosed to the
decision maker, who thus does not engage in harmful consumption.
By contrast, when p > pa, that is, when the decision maker would consume absent further
information, the optimal incentive-compatible mechanism involves randomization and, with
positive probability, harmful consumption. Specifically, if θ = θ, then the recommendation
to consume is issued with probability pi∗γc(θ) = 0, while, if θ = θ, then the recommendation
to consume is issued with probability pi∗γc(θ) ∈ (0, 1), where
p[1− pi∗γc(θ)]
p[1− pi∗γc(θ)] + 1− p
= pa. (20)
Therefore, the recommendation to consume reveals that θ = θ, which triggers consumption
as θ < ta. By contrast, the recommendation to abstain does not fully disclose θ to the
decision maker: according to (19)–(20), the decision maker’s mean posterior belief about θ
following the recommendation to abstain is equal to ta, that is, the minimum level consistent
with him abstaining. In this way, this recommendation is used in the most efficient way,
while remaining credible.
It is interesting to point out how the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism
responds to an increase in the severity of the decision maker’s bias for the present, that is,
a decrease in β. First, according to (3), the cutoff ta increases, reflecting that the decision
maker engages in potentially harmful consumption for a larger value of the mean posterior
belief θˆ. According to (19), this, in turn, decreases the cutoff belief pa that θ = θ below
which the decision maker abstains absent any further information: he must thus be more
pessimistic to abstain. Finally, according to (20), if p > pa, the probability of issuing the
recommendation to abstain conditional on θ = θ must decrease to preserve its credibility.
Overall, harmful consumption is more likely to take place, the more severe the decision
maker’s bias for the present. The optimal information nudge then mostly targets high-
risk individuals to the detriment of low-risk individuals, who would still prefer a warning
that would deter them from consuming. An example of such selective nudging is alcohol
warnings that target pregnant women—instead of the whole population of consumers who
should better drink less.
4.2 The Nonatomic Case
Suppose next that P is nonatomic, with full support over [0, 1]. Then the optimal incentive-
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compatible persuasion mechanism recommends abstinence when θ > t∗ ≡ max{th, tc}, where
tc is defined by (18). The most interesting scenario arises when (15) does not hold, so that
the optimal incentive-compatible mechanism pi∗γc involves harmful consumption and t
c > th
is the unique solution to (17). As a result, one also has tc < ta: therefore, there are types
close to but below ta, for which harmful consumption would necessarily take place under
complete information, but which are completely neutralized under pi∗γc . That t
c > th reflects
that consumption must take place for types for which consumption is slightly harmful to
preserve the credibility of the mechanism when it recommends abstinence for types for which
consumption is more harmful, but would nevertheless take place if these types were disclosed.
Notice, incidentally, that there are multiple ways of implementing the cutoff mechanism pi∗γc :
indeed, consumption for types θ ≥ tc can indifferently be triggered by fully disclosing these
types, or by sending the message that θ ≤ tc. Thus, the optimal information nudge does not
have to be simple—but it can be. What is crucial is the composition of the target group
that receives a warning against consumption.
4.2.1 Sampling versus Information Design
It is instructive to compare these results to those obtained by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000),
assuming that the decision maker can sample costless information about θ at date 0 before
making his consumption decisions.10 Then the decision maker never finds it optimal to
consume without the benefit of full information about θ. Indeed, because, at any stage of
the sampling process, his posterior beliefs have full support over [0, 1] and thus put a strictly
positive weight on the abstinence interval [ta, 1], he is strictly better off, before engaging
in consumption, acquiring information that will either confirm his consumption decision or
lead him to rationally abstain. In the present model, by contrast, the posterior belief of the
decision maker following a recommendation to consume is P[· |θ ≤ tc], the support of which
does not intersect [ta, 1] as tc < ta; as noted above, the decision maker is then indifferent
about acquiring additional information about θ.
A common feature of the two models is that abstinence can be only sustained for mean
posterior beliefs θˆ ≥ ta; this inequality is typically strict when the decision maker samples
information himself, while it is an equality in the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion
mechanism. This, in turn, reflects that ignorance is achieved in different ways in the two
models. In the sampling model, when the decision maker has a current posterior belief
with mean θˆ slightly above ta and with low variance, it is typically optimal for him to stop
10An infinitely-lived decision maker may also proceed to such sampling at dates τ = 1, 2, . . . without
affecting the results.
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sampling. Indeed, conditional on θ < ta, it is likely that θ will be close to ta; there is then a
nonnegligible risk that the decision maker will eventually learn this and be trapped in harmful
consumption. By contrast, in the present information-design model, types θ < ta close to
ta are completely neutralized as they are pooled with types θ ≥ ta. Thus, although the
rationale for strategic ignorance is the same in the two models, and although the decision
maker’s beliefs follow a martingale in both cases, sampling creates an additional risk by
making pieces of information available only sequentially; this creates a further motive for
information avoidance, inducing the decision maker to be more cautious in his collection of
information. By contrast, the release of signals in the information-design model is optimized
by a mechanism designer, contingent on the value of θ; thus everything happens as if all
sampling was done ex ante and different pieces of information were batched together to be
optimally presented to the decision maker.
Overall, no decision-maker type should better avoid the optimized information nudge.
In contrast, the only “shortcoming” of the optimal nudge may be that the target group is
smaller than some types may wish for. However, a tightening of the target group is necessary
in order to preserve credibility and efficiently mitigate self-control problems.
4.2.2 Comparative Statics
Distributions The characterization (17) of the cutoff tc leads to unambiguous comparative
statics in terms of the distribution P. Suppose indeed that P dominates P in the hazard-rate
order, that is, (1− F )/(1− F ) is increasing over [0, 1). By the full support assumption, the
conditional distributions P[· |θ > t] and P[· |θ > t] are well defined for all t ∈ [0, 1), and the
assumption that P dominates P in the hazard-rate order is equivalent to the condition that,
for each t ∈ [0, 1), P[· | θ > t] first-order stochastically dominates P[· | θ > t] (Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007, Section 1.B.1)). This, in turn, implies that E[θ | θ > t] > E[θ | θ > t]
for any such t. It then follows from (17) that the cutoff tc is strictly less under P than
under P, tc < tc. Thus, if the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism when θ
is distributed according to P involves no consumption for some type, then neither does the
optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism when θ is distributed according to P.
The intuition is that, for any cutoff t ∈ [0, 1), the announcement that θ > t is more efficient
at discouraging consumption under P than under P. Hence it is credible to set the cutoff tc
at a lower value under P than under P, which allows the mechanism designer to neutralize
a larger set of types for which consumption would be harmful. Because such types are more
likely under P than under P by first-order stochastic dominance, the following result holds.
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Corollary 1 If the distribution P dominates the distribution P in the hazard-rate order, the
probability of consuming is strictly lower under P than under P.
Intuitively, two effects are reinforcing each other: it is more desirable to discourage
consumption under P than under P, and it is also an easier task for the mechanism designer.
Bias for the Present We now turn to the comparative statics with respect to the severity
of the decision maker’s bias for the present. To see how a change in β affects the probability of
consuming, it is helpful to start with a closer examination of the condition (15) under which
the unconstrained-optimal mechanism pi∗γu associated to the cutoff t
h is incentive-compatible.
Using (3)–(4), this condition can be explicitly written as
E
[
θ |θ > 1 + βδ
(1 + δ)βδ2C
]
≥ 1
βδ2C
. (21)
As a time-consistent decision maker never engages into harmful consumption, a natural
guess is that the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism involves no harmful
consumption and, hence, coincides with piu when the decision maker’s bias for the present is
not too severe. This intuition is confirmed by the observation that, because the distribution
P has full support, a sufficient condition for (21) to hold is that β be close enough to 1.
This condition turns out to be necessary when the distribution P satisfies a weakening of the
monotone-hazard-rate property. We will henceforth assume that P has a continuous density
f over [0, 1] that is positive over (0, 1). The appropriate regularity concept for distributions
can then be formulated as follows.
Definition 1 The distribution P is λ-regular for some λ ≥ 0 if
rλ(t) ≡ f(t)
[1− F (t)]λ (22)
is strictly increasing in t ∈ [0, 1).
It is clear from (22) that a lower value of λ corresponds to a more stringent restriction
on the distribution P; thus 0-regularity means that the density f is strictly increasing, 1-
regularity is the strict monotone-hazard-rate property, and 2-regularity is equivalent to strict
Myerson-regularity.11 The following result holds.
Corollary 2 If the distribution P is [2− 1/(1 + δ)]-regular, then the unconstrained-optimal
persuasion mechanism pi∗γu is incentive-compatible if and only if β ≥ βu, where βu is the
unique value of β ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1) that achieves equality in (21).
11See Ewerhart (2013) for this last equivalence and Schweizer and Szech (2017) for a systematic exploration.
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Thus, for a fixed [2−1/(1+δ)]-regular distribution P, if the optimal incentive-compatible
persuasion mechanism for a decision maker with time-inconsistency parameter β involves
no harmful consumption, then neither does the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion
mechanism for a decision maker with time-inconsistency parameter β > β. That is, harmful
consumption takes place if and only if the decision maker’s bias for the present is severe
enough. Some regularity of the distribution of θ is necessary for obtaining such a clear-cut
result. What is needed is a bound on the derivative with respect to t of the upper-tail
conditional expectation E[θ |θ > t].12 We will henceforth assume that the distribution P is
[2− 1/(1 + δ)]-regular.
Observe that the cutoff t∗ = max{th, tc} for θ above which abstinence is recommended is
strictly decreasing in β ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1). Indeed, if β ∈ [βu, 1), then th ≥ tc, and this directly
follows from (3)–(4); if β ∈ (1/(δ2C), βu), then tc > th, and this directly follows from (3)
and (18). Thus, if the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism for a decision
maker with time-inconsistency parameter β involves abstinence for a given value of θ, then
so does the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism for a decision maker with
time-inconsistency parameter β > β. That is, a more severe bias for the present increases
the probability that consumption takes place.
What about harmful consumption? There are two effects at play here. On the one
hand, from the above reasoning, there are values of θ such that the decision maker would be
trapped in harmful consumption under β but abstain under β; on the other hand, according
to (3)–(4), the lower bound th of the harmful-consumption interval [th, ta] is lower under
β than under β, because the decision maker attaches greater importance to future costs of
consuming. Hence, any statement about how harmful consumption varies with β under the
optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism is necessarily of a probabilistic nature.
The following result is a first step in that direction. It shows that, under a strengthening of
the strict monotone-hazard-rate property, harmful consumption is more likely to take place,
the more severe the decision maker’s bias for the present is.
Corollary 3 If the distribution P satisfies the strict monotone-hazard-rate property and its
density f does not decrease too fast, in the sense that, for all t and t′,
t > t′ implies f(t) >
1
1 + δ
f(t′), (23)
then the probability F (tc) − F (th) that harmful consumption takes place under the optimal
incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism is strictly decreasing in β ∈ (1/(δ2C), βu).
12Remark A.1 in the Online Appendix provides an example that violates this bound; the unconstrained-
optimal persuasion mechanism is then incentive-compatible over two disjoint intervals of values for β.
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Condition (23) is satisfied, for instance, if P is the uniform distribution. However, it is
not satisfied, for instance, if P is a Beta(a, b) distribution with a, b > 1, which satisfies the
monotone-hazard-rate property (Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)), but not condition (23) as
then f(1) = 0. The following result shows that Corollary 3 does not extend to this case.
Corollary 4 If the distribution P satisfies the strict monotone-hazard-rate property and its
density f is nonincreasing in a left-neighborhood of t = 1 or strictly positive at t = 1, and if
f(1) <
1
2(1 + δ)
f
(
1 + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
, (24)
then the probability F (tc) − F (th) that harmful consumption takes place under the optimal
incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism is strictly increasing in β in a right-neighborhood
of β = 1/(δ2C).
Thus, whenever the decision maker’s bias for the present is already severe, a decrease in
this bias can actually lead to an increase in the probability of harmful consumption. This
contrasts with the binary case, where the probability of harmful consumption is decreasing
in β. Condition (24), which is satisfied as soon as f(1) = 0, can be intuitively interpreted as
follows. If initially β ≈ 1/(δ2C), then almost all types consume under the optimal incentive-
compatible persuasion mechanism, that is, tc ≈ 1. If β increases by dβ, then the cutoff tc
above which abstinence is recommended decreases by some amount dtc, so that a mass of
types approximately equal to f(1) dtc can be neutralized. At the same time, however, the
cutoff th above which consumption is harmful,
th =
E[θ |θ > tc] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
≈ 1 + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
,
decreases by an amount dth approximately equal to 1/(1+δ) {dE[θ |θ > t]/dt}|t=1 dtc, which
is at least 1/[2(1 + δ)] dtc under the weak conditions we impose on f .13 The mass of new
types thus trapped in harmful consumption is approximately equal to 1/[2(1 + δ)]f(th) dtc,
which exceeds the mass f(1) dtc of neutralized types if (24) is satisfied.
5 Alternative Objective Functions
So far, we have focused on benevolent persuasion mechanisms that maximize the decision
maker’s date-0 utility. We now contrast this optimal liberal policy with the optimal policies
13The intuition for the factor 2 is easy to grasp when f(1) > 0. Indeed, in that case, the distribution of θ
conditional on θ > t is approximately uniform when t is close to 1 as f is continuous, and hence a marginal
increase dt in t increases E [θ |θ > t] by approximately d[ 12 (t+ 1)] = 12 dt.
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of other interest groups. For instance, a lobbyist might have an interest in implementing an
information nudge that convinces as many people as possible to consume. By contrast, a
health authority focusing on the long-run health effects of harmful consumption and ignoring
its short-term enjoyable aspects might want to use an information nudge that deters as
many people as possible from consuming. Motivated by these two polar cases, we consider
the problems of finding incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize or minimize the
expected probability of consuming, solving, respectively,14
max{E[pi(θ)] : pi is incentive-compatible}, (25)
min{E[pi(θ)] : pi is incentive-compatible}. (26)
Recall that, if some mechanism pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ is incentive-compatible, then so is
the cutoff mechanism pi∗γ. We can thus again focus on cutoff mechanisms. The maximizer in
(25) wants to choose the largest incentive-compatible γ, while the minimizer in (26) wants
to choose the smallest one. Hence a lobbyist wants the target group such that the warning
loses its impact to be as large as possible; by contrast, a health authority wants to send
a convincing warning and therefore needs to tighten the target group. If the bias for the
present is severe enough, this may imply that many types who would rather abstain cannot
be warned. In the following, we study how this sacrifice needs to be done.
Observe that, depending on the parameters of the model, one of the two problems (25)–
(26) is always trivial. Indeed, if E[θ] < ta, then the decision maker consumes absent further
information. The uninformative persuasion mechanism associated to γ = 1 thus solves (25)
in this case, so that, from a lobbyist’s perspective, there is no need for an information nudge.
Conversely, if E[θ] ≥ ta, then the decision maker abstains absent further information. The
uninformative persuasion mechanism associated to γ = 0 thus solves (26) in this case, so that,
from a health authority’s perspective, there is no need for an information nudge. However,
a lobbyist would like to spread information, in order to seduce low-risk types into harmful
consumption, as we analyze in detail below.
Overall, depending on the value of β, the same nudge either minimizes or maximizes the
probability of consumption. Specifically, notice that there always exists βm ∈ (0, 1) such that
ta(βm) = E[θ]. The mechanism that minimizes the probability of consumption for β ≥ βm
maximizes it for β < βm. Therefore, a misspecification of β can lead to an information nudge
with consequences opposite to those initially intended: a miscalibrated health authority may
14Notice that this formulation implicitly assumes that θ is unobserved by the mechanism designer. One
possible interpretation is that θ corresponds to a consumer’s individual disposition for being harmed by
consumption which is independently distributed across consumers.
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think that a lobbyist’s policy is ideal from a health perspective when, indeed, exactly the
opposite is the case. A health authority must thus be careful not to overestimate β, that
is, not to underestimate agents’ bias for the present. The converse holds for a lobbyist who
must be careful not to overestimate agents’ bias for the present.
There remains to study (25) for E[θ] ≥ ta and (26) for E[θ] < ta. Consider first the
latter problem. The left-hand side of (11) strictly and continuously increases in γ from θ to
E[θ], while the left-hand side of (12) strictly and continuously increases in γ from E[θ] to θ.
By Assumption 1, θ < ta < θ. Thus (11) is satisfied for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. To satisfy (12), γ has
to be chosen sufficiently large. By continuity, there exists a single value γmin of γ in (0, 1)
such that (12) holds with equality,
E[θ[1− pi∗γmin(θ)]]
E[1− pi∗
γmin
(θ)]
= ta. (27)
Thus γmin is the smallest value of γ that is consistent with an incentive-compatible persuasion
mechanism. As a result, pi∗γmin solves (26). A key observation that follows from (16) and (27)
is that γmin coincides with γc, the probability of consuming in the decision-maker-optimal
incentive-compatible mechanism in the case where the unconstrained-optimal mechanism
pi∗γu is not incentive-compatible. Hence we can reinterpret the mechanism characterized in
Propositions 1–2 as follows: if possible, implement the unconstrained-optimal mechanism;
otherwise, implement the mechanism that minimizes the probability of consuming. The
decision maker’s interests are, therefore, aligned with those of a health authority aiming at
minimizing the probability of consuming if his bias for the present is severe enough.
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between the optimal liberal policy and the consumption-
minimizing policy as functions of the time-inconsistency parameter β. Types are distributed
with quadratic density f(θ) = 12(θ − 1
2
)2, and we set δ = 0.9 and C = 1.5. As the figure
demonstrates, for β  βu ≈ 0.867, the proportion of consumers who abstain under the
consumption-minimizing policy (dotted line) is much higher than the proportion of those
who abstain under the optimal liberal policy (dashed line). In this case, the optimal liberal
policy coincides with the unconstrained-optimal policy. When the bias for the present is more
severe, that is, for β between 1/(δ2C) ≈ 0.8230 and βu, stronger warnings are necessary in
order to successfully deter consumption. The abstinence probabilities of the optimal liberal
policy and of the consumption-minimizing policy coincide (solid black line). As β further
decreases towards 1/(δ2C), the probability of harmful consumption (solid grey line) increases
substantially because the target group receiving a credible warning needs to be increasingly
tightened. For β near 1/(δ2C), more than 20% of consumers are in the harmful-consumption
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Figure 3: Probabilities of abstinence and of harmful consumption as functions of β.
trap, and only a tiny fraction of types can be convinced to abstain under such a severe bias
for the present.
Let us now turn to the lobbyist’s perspective. Problem (25) for E[θ] ≥ ta is almost the
mirror image of problem (26) for E[θ] < ta. In this case, (12) trivially holds, while γ has to
be chosen sufficiently small to ensure that (11) is satisfied. We can characterize a threshold
γmax via equality in (11),
E[θpi∗γmax(θ)]
E[pi∗γmax(θ)]
= ta. (28)
However, due the fact that (6) is a strict inequality constraint, the mechanism pi∗γmax is not
incentive-compatible if the decision maker’s behavior is described by the efficient subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal game characterized in Lemma 1. As a result, (25)
does not possess a solution. Instead, the best the lobbyist can do is to implement a cutoff
mechanism with γ = γmax − ε for some small ε > 0. Alternatively, we may assume that,
in the intrapersonal game, self-0 and self-1 coordinate on the least efficient subgame-perfect
equilibrium, in which they both consume for a mean posterior belief θˆ = ta. In that case, it
is possible to implement a cutoff mechanism with γ = γmax which maximizes the expected
probability of consuming. This mechanism cynically takes advantage of the decision maker’s
self-control problem by issuing the recommendation to consume in such a way that, upon
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receiving it, the decision maker ends up, in terms of his date-0 utility, at the lowest point of
the harmful-consumption trap. In analogy with (18), the corresponding cutoff for θ can be
characterized as follows. If the equation
E[θ |θ ≤ t] = ta (29)
has a solution t = tmax, then γmax = F (tmax) and pi∗γmax = 1{θ≤tmax}. For now familiar reasons,
if P has atoms, such a solution need not exist. In that case, the optimal mechanism may
necessitate randomization to achieve an equality in constraint (11), as required by (28). In
analogy with (18), let
tmax ≡ inf {t ∈ [ta, 1] : E[θ |θ ≤ t] ≥ ta}, (30)
which is well defined by Assumption 1 as E[θ] ≥ ta. Because E[θ |θ ≤ t] is right-continuous
in t, it follows that either (29) is satisfied by tmax or (29) has no solution. In the latter case,
we have P[θ = tmax] > 0, E[θ | θ < tmax] ≤ ta, and E[θ | θ ≤ tmax] > ta. If the second
of these inequalities is an equality, then it is optimal to recommend to abstain for sure at
θ = tmax and pi∗γmax = 1{θ<tmax}. If this inequality is strict, recommending to abstain for
sure at θ = tmax would make the recommendation to abstain inefficiently alarming, thereby
preventing the lobbyist from inducing consumption with probability γmax, while, according
to the third inequality, recommending to consume for sure at θ = tmax would undermine
the credibility of the mechanism. Randomization at the atom tmax is then required, in line
with Lemma 2. In any case, it is easy to check from (30) that P[(ta, tmax]] > 0, so that, if
E[θ] > ta, there are types who are trapped in harmful consumption who, had they not been
exposed to further information, would have abstained. This shows how a present-biased
decision maker can fall prey to an opportunistic information design.
For example, nutritionists argue that by issuing warnings for specific high-risk groups
only, many foods may still feel appropriate for people of lower risk type.15 These people
then continue to consume not so healthy foods that they may otherwise have started to
call into question. Examples include an abundant consumption of fatty cheese and meat
products which can possibly deteriorate health, and should better be replaced by healthier
choices such as vegetables and fruits. This is likely not only true for people with specifically
high risk of stroke or heart disease, but for everybody.16 Thus the release of a warning
15Compare, for instance, Fuhrman (2011).
16See, for instance, advice by the Mayo Clinic for a heart healthy diet, www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/heart-disease/in-depth/heart-healthy-diet/art-20047702 as well as dietary recommendations
by the Australian Heart Foundation to those who had to suffer from a heart attack, www.heart
foundation.org.au/after-my-heart-attack/heart-attack-recovery/diets-and-meals.
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to a high-risk group can at the same time function as a justification to continue harmful
consumption for those of lower risk, belonging to the nontarget group. Policy makers need
to be aware of this problem which arises because of present-biased preferences.
6 Traffic-Light Nudges
Not all individuals suffer from the same self-control problems. On the one hand, people
seem to differ in their overall self-control capacities (Mischel (2014), Sutter, Kocher, Gla¨tzle-
Ru¨tzler, and Trautmann (2013)). Studies suggest that the genetic profile plays a significant
role for whether or not a person becomes addicted to harmful behaviors (Davis and Loxton
(2013)). Moreover, parenting seems to affect the development of self-control in children
(Finkenauer, Engels, and Baumeister (2005)). On the other hand, the specific context can
matter a lot. While smoking may be very tempting for some consumers, others may find
it easy to resist cigarettes, yet lose their self-control when it comes to chocolate or candy.
Also, self-control relies on levels of glucose available, so that a hungry individual may display
comparatively little self-control (Gailliot and Baumeister (2007)).
To address these issues, we analyze optimal information nudges in a mixed population,
a share pL ∈ (0, 1) of which has low self-control and the remaining share pH has high self-
control, with corresponding time-inconsistency parameters 0 < βL < βH ≤ 1.17 The vNM
utility functions at dates 0 and 1 for type i = L,H are given by
Ui,0(x0, x1, θ) = x0(1− βiδ2θC) + x1βiδ(1− δ2θC), (31)
Ui,1(x0, x1, θ) = −x0βiδC + x1(1− βiδ2θC). (32)
Whether a specific decision maker is of type L or H is unknown to the mechanism designer.
Her goal is to maximize social welfare at date 0. In the following, we focus on the case
where each decision maker is offered the same information structure. For simplicity, we will
assume that P has a continuous density f over [0, 1] that is positive over (0, 1) and, whenever
needed, that P is [2− 1/(1 + δ)]-regular.
It is clear from (31)–(32) that, for any mean posterior belief θˆ, type L consumes whenever
type H does. Therefore, we can focus on measurable direct persuasion mechanisms x :
Θ× Ω→ {0, L, LH} issuing a recommendation for both types to abstain (0), for only type
L to consume (L), or for both types to consume (LH). In analogy with (5), the probability
of issuing recommendation j = 0, L, LH is
pij(θ) = λ[{ω ∈ Ω : x(θ, ω) = j}]. (33)
17In particular, we allow for the case βH = 1 where type H is not present-biased.
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As in Section 3.2, we can identify x with pi ≡ (pi0, piL, piLH). For each type i, we denote by
tai , t
h
i , t
c
i , and t
∗
i ≡ max{thi , tci} the relevant cutoffs defined in Sections 2–3.
6.1 The No-Externality Case
We first analyze under which circumstances the two types exert no externality on each other.
For each type i, the optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism characterized in
Propositions 1–2 recommends abstinence if θ > t∗i , and we have t
∗
H < t
∗
L. The same outcome
can be achieved in a mixed population if and only if the mechanism
(pi∗0, pi
∗
L, pi
∗
LH)(θ) ≡ (1{θ>t∗L}, 1{t∗H<θ≤t∗L}, 1{θ≤t∗H}) (34)
is incentive-compatible. This is the case if and only if, upon receiving recommendation L,
type H is willing to abstain, that is,
E[θ | t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] ≥ taH . (35)
For βH close enough to 1, we have t
∗
H = t
h
H ≈ taH , and the incentive-compatibility constraint
(35) is slack. By contrast, for βH close enough to βL, we have (t
∗
H , t
a
H) ≈ (t∗L, taL) and the
incentive-compatibility constraint (35) is violated as t∗L < t
a
L. The following result formalizes
the idea that the two types exert no externality on each other if and only if βH is large
enough relative to βL, so that a single traffic-light nudge can replicate the outcome of the
individually optimal information nudges.
Proposition 3 If the distribution P is [2− 1/(1 + δ)]-regular, then, for each βL > 1/(δ2C),
there exists a threshold βˆH(βL) ∈ (βL, 1) such that the mechanism (34) is incentive-compatible
if and only if βH ≥ βˆH(βL). Moreover, the threshold βˆH(βL) is strictly greater than βu and
is strictly increasing in βL.
6.2 The Externality Case
We now analyze the case where the individually optimal incentive-compatible persuasion
mechanisms are not simultaneously implementable, so that the two types exert an externality
on each other. A mechanism (pi0, piL, piLH) is incentive-compatible if and only if
E[θpi0(θ)]
E[pi0(θ)]
≥ taL, (36)
E[θpiL(θ)]
E[piL(θ)]
< taL, (37)
E[θpiL(θ)]
E[piL(θ)]
≥ taH , (38)
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E[θpiLH(θ)]
E[piLH(θ)]
< taH . (39)
Letting ΠL ≡ piL + piLH and ΠH ≡ piLH be the respective probabilities of consuming for
type L and type H, the optimal-design problem can then, up to a multiplicative constant
(1 + δ)δ2C, be formulated as18
max
{∑
i
piβi{thi E[Πi(θ)]− E[θΠi(θ)]} : pi is incentive-compatible
}
. (40)
For simplicity, we will henceforth focus on the case where types L and H differ enough in
their levels of self-control, so that the intervals [thL, t
a
L] and [t
h
H , t
a
H ] do not overlap.
Assumption 2 taH < t
h
L.
Thus, conditional on the same posterior belief θˆ ∈ (taH , thL), type L at date 0 favors a
higher consumption rate than type H at date 1. By (3)–(4), Assumption 2 is equivalent to
βH > β˜H(βL) ≡ (1 + δ)βL
1 + βLδ
∈ (0, 1),
so that βH is large enough relative to βL. This lower bound is consistent with βH < βˆH(βL),
in which case, according to Proposition 3, we are indeed in the externality case. To see
this, suppose, for instance, that βL ∈ [βu, 1), so that t∗L = thL by Corollary 2. Then, for
βH = β˜H(βL), we have t
h
L = t
a
H > t
∗
H , and constraint (35) is violated as
E[θ|t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] = E[θ|t∗H < θ ≤ taH ] < taH .
Hence, for βL ∈ [βu, 1) and βH = β˜H(βL), the mechanism (34) is not incentive-compatible
and the threshold βˆH(βL) in Proposition 3 satisfies βˆH(βL) > β˜H(βL). The following result
shows that, under Assumption 2, a two-cutoff mechanism is optimal.
Proposition 4 There exists a pair of cutoffs 0 < t∗∗LH ≤ t∗∗L ≤ 1 such that
(pi∗∗0 , pi
∗∗
L , pi
∗∗
LH)(θ) ≡ (1{θ>t∗∗L }, 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L }, 1{θ≤t∗∗LH}) (41)
is an optimal incentive-compatible mechanism.
When t∗∗LH < t
∗∗
L , the optimal mechanism for simultaneously targeting types L and H
can thus be implemented via a monotone traffic-light nudge; as we will see in Lemma 3,
18Notice that the populations share pL and pH can also be interpreted as Pareto weights in the mechanism
designer’s social-welfare function.
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this is always the case under Assumption 2. High-risk consumers with θ > t∗∗L receive a
warning to abstain, regardless of their level of self-control. This signal corresponds to a red
traffic light; all consumers will find their risk high enough to abstain. For intermediate-risk
consumers with t∗∗LH < θ ≤ t∗∗L , those with high self-control receive a warning to abstain, while
those with low self-control receive a recommendation to consume. This signal corresponds
to a yellow traffic light; while consumers with high self-control will find their risk high
enough to abstain, consumers with low self-control will consume. Low-risk consumers with
θ ≤ t∗∗LH receive a recommendation to consume, regardless of their level of self-control. This
signal corresponds to a green traffic light; all consumers will find their risk low enough to
consume. Thus a traffic-light nudge can optimally reach consumers with low self-control
without sacrificing consumers with high self-control.19 Koenigstorfer, Groeppel-Klein, and
Kamm (2014) confirm this prediction in an empirical study, comparing consumers with high
and low levels of self-control.
Proposition 4 generalizes the optimality of cutoff mechanisms to the more realistic case
of heterogenous β’s. As in the proof of Lemma 2 for the homogeneous case, the intuition is
based on a comparison of all mechanisms that assign the same probabilities to the different
recommendations. As before, using a cutoff t∗∗LH to distinguish between “green” and “yellow”
is good for both efficiency and incentive-compatibility purposes. For the optimal decision
whether to display “yellow” or “red” there arises, however, a novel tradeoff. On the one
hand, pooling the highest risk types into “red” rather than “yellow” is good for efficiency
purposes as this signal induces consumers to abstain regardless of their level of self-control.
On the other hand, pooling the highest risk types into “yellow” rather than “red” is good for
incentive-compatibility purposes as this relaxes the incentive constraint (38). In the Online
Appendix, we prove that, under Assumption 2, the first effect dominates. We also show that,
when Assumption 2 does not hold, the second effect may dominate, and a nonmonotone
traffic-light nudge of the form
(pi∗∗0 , pi
∗∗
L , pi
∗∗
LH)(θ) ≡ (1{t∗∗L <θ≤t∗∗L }, 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L } + 1{θ>t∗∗L }, 1{θ≤t∗∗LH}) (42)
may be optimal.
Several studies document that traffic-light labels work. For example, they are used to
promote healthy food choices, see Hawley, Roberto, Bragg, Liu, Schwartz, and Brownell
(2013), Thorndike, Riis, Sonnenberg, and Levy (2014), and the references therein. Relying
19Another useful aspect of traffic-light nudges may be their easy-to-grasp connotation. A red signal may
be an especially salient warning. Indeed, the empirical literature is mixed on whether traffic-light labels
render the provision of information more effective or not, see VanEpps, Downs, and Loewenstein (2016) for
a discussion. Yet, of course, this aspect is beyond the analysis of this paper.
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on nationally representative data from six European nations, Reisch and Sunstein (2016)
demonstrate that there is also broad support in the population for the introduction of such
information nudges in order to support healthy eating habits and fight obesity.
Our next result explicitly characterizes the optimal cutoffs (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ).
Lemma 3 Suppose that (35) does not hold, so that the individually optimal mechanisms
with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, and let tˆLH(t
∗
L) be implicitly
defined by
E[θ | tˆLH(t∗L) < θ ≤ t∗L] = taH . (43)
Then the optimal cutoffs (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) in (41) are given by
1. (tˆLH(t
∗
L), t
∗
L) if and only if
pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
≤ t
a
H − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
,
2. (t∗H , 1) if and only if
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
≥ t
a
H − t∗H
1− taH
,
3. the unique solution to
E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ ≤ t∗∗L ] = taH and
pHβH
pLβL
t∗∗LH − thH
t∗∗L − thL
=
taH − t∗∗LH
t∗∗L − taH
(44)
otherwise.
The characterization in Case 3 exactly reflects the tradeoff faced by the mechanism
designer when she attempts to simultaneously persuade both types. Pooling marginally more
risks into “yellow” rather than in “green” by decreasing t∗∗LH comes at a benefit proportional
to pHβH(t
∗∗
LH − thH) due to higher abstinence of type H. Yet there is also the marginal cost
of tightening type H’s incentive constraint from below, which is proportional to taH − t∗∗LH .
Similarly, pooling marginally more risks into “red” rather than in “yellow” by decreasing
t∗∗L comes at a benefit proportional to pLβL(t
∗∗
L − thL) due to higher abstinence of type L.
Yet there is also the marginal cost of tightening type H’s incentive constraint from above,
which is proportional to t∗∗L − taH . In an interior solution, we obtain the standard result
that the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal cost ratio, where the cost is here
measured in terms of tightening type H’s incentive constraint. Case 1 corresponds to a
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corner solution in which the marginal rate of substitution of decreases in tLH for decreases
in tL is everywhere less than the marginal cost ratio, so that type L faces his individually
optimal mechanism with cutoff t∗L. Similarly, Case 2 corresponds to a corner solution in
which the designer entirely gives up on inducing abstinence for type L in order to achieve
the maximum possible abstinence probability for type H.
We conclude this section with comparative statics with respect to the population share,
which notably determines which of Cases 1–3 in Lemma 3 arises.
Corollary 5 Suppose that (35) does not hold, so that the individually optimal mechanisms
with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable. Then there exist thresholds
0 ≤ p < p ≤ 1 such that
1. for pH ∈ [0, p], the optimal mechanism implements the individually optimal cutoff t∗L
for type L and the cutoff for type H is determined by (43),
2. for pH ∈ [p, 1], the optimal mechanism implements the individually optimal cutoff t∗H
for type H, while type L always consumes,
3. for pH ∈ (p, p), the optimal mechanism implements the interior solution determined by
(44). Consumption of type H is strictly decreasing in pH , while consumption of type L
is strictly increasing in pH .
Moreover, p = 0 if and only if the individually unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type
L is incentive-compatible in the sense of Proposition 1, and similarly p = 1 if and only if
the individually unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type L is incentive-compatible in the
sense of Proposition 1.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the optimal design of credible information nudges for populations of
heterogeneous consumers with present-biased preferences. We found that the implementation
of optimal information structures is easy in the sense that they are of cutoff type: an optimal
information nudge should focus on a specific target group, and present a signal that is credible
to this target group.
Yet the design of optimal information nudges is challenging in the sense that the bias
for the present plays a crucial role: depending on how drastic it is, the target group needs
to be adapted. Populations with a heavy bias need a much more drastic signal in order to
34
avoid harmful consumption. From a liberal designer’s perspective, this means that fewer
consumers can receive a credible signal to abstain. If consumers have different biases for the
present, the traffic-light structure of the optimal nudge addresses this problem by releasing
a specifically strong, red warning in addition to a milder, yellow warning.
A lobbyist aiming at high consumption rates will provide an information nudge of no
impact, or, worse, one that tempts people into consumption who would otherwise abstain. If
policy makers overlook or underestimate consumers’ self-control problems, such a nudge may
seem health-concerned when in fact exactly the opposite is the case. It is thus a necessity for
policy makers to figure in effects of self-control when it comes to the design and evaluation
of powerful information nudges to limit harmful consumption.
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Technical Appendix (For Online Publication)
Proof of Corollary 2. For future reference, we more generally show the result for any left-
truncation Pb ≡ P[· | θ ≤ b] of P, with cumulative distribution function Fb and probability
density function fb over the support [0, b], where 1/(δ
2C) < b ≤ 1. Corollary 2 corresponds
to the special case b = 1. An important observation is that λ-regularity is preserved by
left-truncation.
Lemma A.1 Suppose that, for some λ ≥ 0, the distribution P is λ-regular. Then, for each
b ∈ (0, 1), the distribution Pb is λ-regular.
Proof. For each t ∈ [0, b), we have
rb,λ(t) ≡ fb(t)
[1− Fb(t)]λ ∝
f(t)
[F (b)− F (t)]λ = rλ(t)
[
1− F (t)
F (b)− F (t)
]λ
, (A.1)
so that rb,λ(t) is the product of two strictly positive and strictly increasing functions of t.
The result follows. 
Now, fix some b ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1) and, for each β ∈ (1/(bδ2C), 1), define
φb(β) ≡ Eb
[
θ |θ > 1 + βδ
(1 + δ)βδ2C
]
− 1
βδ2C
. (A.2)
We show that there exists a unique solution βub to φb(β) = 0 and that φb(β) ≥ 0 if and only if
β ≥ βub . This, in particular, implies Corollary 2, with βu ≡ βu1 . Because f is continuous, so is
φb. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, we only need to check that φb(1/(bδ
2C)) < 0,
that φb(1) > 0, and that φb is strictly increasing. As for the first two statements, we have
φb
(
1
bδ2C
)
= Eb
[
θ |θ > 1 + bδC
(1 + δ)δC
]
− b and φb(1) = Eb
[
θ |θ > 1
δ2C
]
− 1
δ2C
,
and the result follows from bδ2C > 1 and the fact that Pb has full support over [0, b]. As for
the third statement, notice that, letting ξ ≡ 1/(βδ2C) and changing variables accordingly,
it is equivalent to the claim that
Eb
[
θ |θ > ξ + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
]
− ξ
is strictly decreasing in ξ ∈ (1/(δ2C), b). That this is the case if P is [2−1/(1+δ)]-regular is
a consequence of the following lemma, which generalizes the standard observation that the
mean residual life is strictly decreasing in the age when P satisfies the monotone-hazard-rate
property (see, for instance, Bryson and Siddiqui (1969)).
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Lemma A.2 Suppose that, for some λ ∈ (0, 2), the distribution P is λ-regular. Then
d
dt
{Eb [θ |θ > t]} < 1
2− λ (A.3)
for all b ∈ (0, 1) and t ∈ [0, b).
Proof. By Lemma A.1, Pb is λ-regular over its support [0, b], so that rb,λ as defined by (A.1)
is strictly increasing. For each t ∈ [0, b),
d
dt
{Eb [θ |θ > t]} = fb(t)
1− Fb(t) {Eb [θ |θ > t]− t}. (A.4)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (A.3) does not hold for some t ∈ [0, b). Then,
according to (A.4) and to the strict monotonicity of rb,λ, we have
fb(θ)
[1− Fb(θ)]λ >
[1− Fb(t)]1−λ
(2− λ){Eb [θ |θ > t]− t}
for all θ ∈ (t, b) and, therefore,∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)]1−λfb(θ) dθ > [1− Fb(t)]
1−λ
(2− λ){Eb [θ |θ > t]− t}
∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)] dθ. (A.5)
As the integral on the left-hand side of (A.5) equals [1−Fb(t)]2−λ/(2−λ), rearranging yields
Eb [θ |θ > t]− t > 1
1− Fb(t)
∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)] dθ. (A.6)
Integrating by parts, we have∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)] dθ =
∫ b
t
θfb(θ) dθ − t[1− Fb(t)].
Substituting in (A.6) and rearranging then yields
Eb [θ |θ > t]− t > Eb [θ |θ > t]− t,
a contradiction. The result follows. 
By Lemma A.2, taking λ = 2− 1/(1 + δ) so that 1/(2− λ) = 1 + δ then implies
d
dξ
{
Eb
[
θ |θ > ξ + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
]
− ξ
}
< 0
for all ξ ∈ (1/(δ2C), b). Hence the result. 
Remark A.1. Figure A.1 below shows that some regularity of P is necessary for a clear-cut
result like Corollary 2. The figure shows ta(β), E[θ | θ > th(β)] and th(β) for C = 2 and
δ = 1, when P is a mixture of three uniform distributions with density
f(t) = 0.1 · 1{t∈[0,1]} + 0.45 · 1{t∈[0.69,0.71]} + 0.45 · 1{t∈[0.94,0.96]}. (A.7)
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Figure A.1: ta(β) (in gray), E[θ | θ > th(β)] (in black) and th(β) (dashed) as functions of β
for θ distributed as in (A.7).
Most of the probability mass is thus concentrated in two small intervals around 0.7 and 0.95.
As β increases, th(β) decreases. Now, as th(β) passes through the interval [0.69, 0.71], which
carries almost half the probability mass, we observe a steep drop in E[θ |θ > th(β)] from the
interval [0.94, 0.96] to values approximately in the middle between 0.7 and 0.95. Before the
drop in the upper-tail conditional expectation, the signal that θ is above th(β) is threatening
enough to prevent harmful consumption. After the drop, this is no longer the case, and the
optimal incentive-compatible mechanism can no longer prevent harmful consumption. Yet at
some point as β increases further, the unconstrained-optimal mechanism becomes incentive-
compatible again. Lemma A.2 shows that λ-regularity puts a bound on the derivative of the
upper-tail conditional expectation function, thus preventing the type of behavior observed
in Figure A.1.
Proof of Corollary 3. According to (3)–(4) and (18), we can rewrite the probability of
harmful consumption as
F (tc)− F (th) = F (tc)− F
(
E[θ |θ > tc] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
.
As observed in the main text, tc is strictly decreasing in β ∈ (1/(δ2C), βu). Hence it is
sufficient to show that
H(t) ≡ F (t)− F
(
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
(A.8)
is strictly increasing in t ∈ (tu, 1), where
tu ≡ 1 + β
uδ
(1 + δ)βuδ2C
.
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Notice for future reference that, for each t ∈ (tu, 1),
t >
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
(A.9)
because, as βu is the unique value of β ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1) that achieves equality in (21), (A.9)
becomes an equality at t = tu and because, as P satisfies the strict monotone-hazard-rate
property, the mapping t 7→ (1 + δ)t− E[θ |θ > t] is strictly increasing over [0, 1). Then, for
each t ∈ (tu, 1),
H ′(t) = f(t)− 1
1 + δ
f
(
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]}
≥ f(t)− 1
1 + δ
f
(
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
> 0, (A.10)
where the first inequality again follows from the strict monotone-hazard-rate property, and
the second inequality follows from (23) and (A.9). Hence the result. 
Proof of Corollary 4. Defining H as in (A.8), we have
d
dβ
[F (tc)− F (ta)] > 0
in a strict right-neighborhood of β = 1/(δ2C) if and only if
H ′ < 0
in a strict left-neighborhood of t = 1 or, equivalently,
f(1)− 1
1 + δ
f
(
1 + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
lim inf
t→1
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]} < 0, (A.11)
according to (A.10). We need to show that (24) implies (A.11) if f(1) > 0 or, if f(1) = 0,
if f is nonincreasing in a left-neighborhood of t = 1.1 That is, we need to show that, under
these assumptions,
lim inf
t→1
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]} ≥ 1
2
. (A.12)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a sequence (tn)n∈N in (0, 1) converging
to 1 such that, for some ε > 0,
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]}
∣∣∣∣
t=tn
<
1− ε
2
1Notice that, in the latter case, condition (24) is automatically satisfied.
4
for all n. Then, according to (A.4), we have
f(tn)
{∫ 1
tn
θf(θ) dθ − tn[1− F (tn)]
}
− 1− ε
2
[1− F (tn)]2 < 0 (A.13)
for all n. Consider then the function
I(t) = f(t)
{∫ 1
t
θf(θ) dθ − t[1− F (t)]
}
− 1− ε
2
[1− F (t)]2.
We clearly have I(1) = 0. We now show that, under the stated assumptions on f , I is
strictly decreasing in a left-neighborhood of t = 1, which, given (A.13), yields the desired
contradiction as the sequence (tn)n∈N converges to 1. As I is continuous, it is sufficient to
show that its right upper Dini derivative D+I is strictly negative in a strict left-neighborhood
of t = 1 (Giorgi and Komlo´si (1992, Theorem 1.14)). Because f is continuous, the mapping
t 7→ ∫ 1
t
θf(θ) dθ− t[1−F (t)] is continuously differentiable. A simple calculation then shows
that, for each t ∈ (0, 1),
D+I(t) = [1− F (t)](D+f(t){E[θ |θ > t]− t} − εf(t)).
Now, recall that f is strictly positive over (0, 1). Thus, if f(1) > 0, then D+I is strictly
negative in a strict left-neighborhood of t = 1 because the mean residual life E[θ |θ > t]− t
converges to zero as t goes to 1; similarly, if f(1) = 0, then, because the mean residual
life E[θ | θ > t] − t is strictly positive for all t ∈ [0, 1), the same conclusion obtains if f
is nonincreasing and hence its right upper Dini derivative D+f is nonpositive in a strict
left-neighborhood of t = 1. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For each βH ∈ (βL, 1), we denote by ta(βH), th(βH), tc(βH), and
t∗(βH) ≡ max{th(βH), tc(βH)} the relevant cutoffs defined in Sections 2–3. It follows from
(3)–(4) that ta and th are continuous. As for tc and t∗, notice that, for each βH ∈ (βL, 1),
the assumption that P has a continuous density f allows us to rewrite (18) as∫ 1
tc(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
1− F (tc(βH)) =
1
βHδ2C
, (A.14)
which implies, using again the assumption that f is continuous, that tc and t∗ are continuous
as well. Now, for each βH ∈ (βL, 1), define
ϕt∗L(βH) ≡ E[θ | t∗(βH) < θ ≤ t∗L]− ta(βH) =
∫ t∗L
t∗(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
F (t∗L)− F (t∗(βH))
− 1
βHδ2C
. (A.15)
Because f and t∗ are continuous, so is ϕt∗L . Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, we
only need to check that ϕt∗L(β
+
L ) < 0, that ϕt∗L(1) > 0, and that ϕt∗L crosses zero only once.
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As for the first two statements, we have
ϕt∗L(β
+
L ) = t
∗
L − ta(βL) and ϕt∗L(1) = E[θ | t∗(1) < θ ≤ t∗L]− ta(1),
and the result follows from t∗L < t
a(βL), t
∗(1) = ta(1) = th(1) < th(βL) ≤ t∗L, and the fact
that P has full support over [0, 1]. As for the third statement, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 If βL < βH < β
u, with βu defined as in Corollary 2, then the unconstrained-
optimal mechanism for type H is not incentive-compatible and, therefore, t∗(βH) = tc(βH) >
th(βH). In this case, from (A.14)–(A.15), we have
ϕt∗L(βH) =
∫ t∗L
tc(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
F (t∗L)− F (tc(βH))
−
∫ 1
tc(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
1− F (tc(βH)) < 0
as t∗L < 1 and P has full support over [0, 1]. It follows that ϕt∗L cannot cross zero over
(βL, β
u).
Case 2 If βH ≥ max{βL, βu}, then the unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type H is
incentive-compatible and, therefore, t∗(βH) = th(βH). In this case, we have
ϕt∗L(βH) = E
[
θ | t∗L ≥ θ >
1 + βHδ
(1 + δ)βHδ2C
]
− 1
βHδ2C
= φt∗L(βH),
where φt∗L(βH) is as defined in (A.2) with b = t
∗
L. As shown in the proof of Corollary 2, if P
is [2 − 1/(1 + δ)]-regular, then φt∗L is strictly increasing and vanishes at a single point βut∗L ,
which defines the desired threshold βˆH(βL). That βˆH(βL) > β
u was shown in Case 1. That
βˆH(βL) is strictly increasing in βL follows from the fact that t
∗
L = t
∗(βL) and, hence, φt∗L are
strictly decreasing in βL. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4. A useful preliminary observation is that, because the mechanism
designer always prefers a higher abstinence rate than the decision maker, we can neglect
constraints (37) and (39) in our quest for an optimal incentive-compatible mechanism.
Lemma A.3 Any solution to the relaxed problem
max
{∑
i
piβi{thi E[Πi(θ)]− E[θΠi(θ)]} : pi satisfies (36) and (38)
}
(A.16)
is a solution to problem (40).
Proof. We show that any solution to (A.16) satisfies (37) and (39), and thus is a solution
to (40). We accordingly distinguish two cases.
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Case 1 Suppose, by way of contradiction, that a solution (pi0, piL, piLH) to (A.16) violates
(37). Then type L would prefer to abstain whenever the recommendation is L. Because the
utility from consumption is weakly lower for the mechanism designer than for type L, the
former prefers abstinence for type L in this case, and a fortiori for type H as taH < t
a
L. Thus
the mechanism (pi0 + piL, 0, piLH) would satisfy (36) and (38) and improve upon the solution
to (A.16), a contradiction.
Case 2 Suppose, by way of contradiction, that a solution (pi0, piL, piLH) to (A.16) violates
(39). Then type H would prefer to abstain whenever the recommendation is LH. Because
the utility from consumption is weakly lower for the mechanism designer than for type H, the
former prefers abstinence for type H in this case. Thus the mechanism (pi0, piL+piLH , 0) would
satisfy (36) and (38) and improve upon the solution to (A.16), once again a contradiction.
The result follows. 
Among all mechanisms pi = (pi0, piL, piLH) that issue recommendation LH with some
probability γLH , the mechanisms with
piLH(θ) = 1{θ<tγLH}
for tγLH ≡ F−1(γLH) are the best for efficiency purposes as they minimize the expected harm
from consumption for a given probability of joint consumption. The following lemma shows
that they are also best at satisfying the incentive constraints (36) and (38), as they issue
recommendations to abstain to higher risk types than any other mechanism with the same
probabilities of consumption recommendations that also satisfies these constraints.
Lemma A.4 For any mechanism pi = (pi0, piL, piLH) that satisfies (36) and (38), there exists
a mechanism p˜i = (p˜i0, p˜iL, p˜iLH) that also satisfies (36), (38), and such that
E[p˜ij(θ)] = E[pij(θ)], j = 0, L, LH, (A.17)
p˜iLH(θ) = 1{θ<tγLH} (A.18)
for γLH ≡ E[piLH(θ)] and tγLH ≡ F−1(γLH). Moreover, p˜i achieves a weakly higher value in
(A.16) than pi, and strictly so if pi does not satisfy (A.18) on a P-nonnull set.
Proof. We go back to the initial formulation of the optimal-design problem, in terms
of direct persuasion mechanisms. Specifically, let x : Θ × Ω → {0, L, LH} be the direct
persuasion mechanism associated to pi, and, for each j ∈ {0, L, LH}, let
γj(tγLH ) ≡ P⊗ λ[{(θ, ω) ∈ Θ× Ω : x(θ, ω) = j ∧ θ < tγLH}]
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be the probability that x issues recommendation j and θ < tγLH . Define a new direct
persuasion mechanism
x˜(θ, ω) ≡

LH if θ ≤ tγLH ,
L if θ > tγLH ∧
(
x(θ, ω) = L ∨
(
x(θ, ω) = LH ∧ ω < γL(tγLH )
γ0(tγLH )+γL(tγLH )
))
,
0 if θ > tγLH ∧
(
x(θ, ω) = 0 ∨
(
x(θ, ω) = LH ∧ ω ≥ γL(tγLH )
γ0(tγLH )+γL(tγLH )
))
,
and let p˜i ≡ (p˜i0, p˜iL, p˜iLH) be the corresponding mechanism. The direct persuasion mechanism
x˜ is constructed such that recommendation probabilities are the same as under the direct
mechanism x, but consumption is recommended to both types if and only if θ ≤ tγLH . Hence
(A.17)–(A.18) hold by construction. Moreover, p˜i satisfies the incentive constraints (36) and
(38), as it gives recommendations to abstain to higher risk types than pi. Finally, p˜i weakly
improves efficiency upon pi, as it induces the same expected consumption levels with a lower
expected harm from consumption, and strictly so if pi does not satisfy (A.18) on a P-nonnull
set. The result follows. 
Lemma A.4 implies that any solution pi∗∗ = (pi∗∗0 , pi
∗∗
L , pi
∗∗
LH) to (A.16) is such that, for
some cutoff t∗∗LH ,
pi∗∗LH(θ) = 1{θ≤t∗∗LH}
up to a P-null set. For any such mechanism, type H consumes if and only if θ ≤ t∗∗LH . Thus
his consumption behavior is already fully determined. Hence, given an optimal cutoff t∗∗LH ,
problem (A.16) reduces to finding a measurable function pi∗∗L : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that vanishes
over [0, t∗∗LH ] and solves
max{thLE[piL(θ)]− E[θpiL(θ)] : pi satisfies (36) and (38)}. (A.19)
As in Section 3.3, the left-hand side of constraint (36) is not well defined if pi0 = 0 P-almost
surely over (t∗∗LH , 1), and similarly the left-hand side of constraint (38) is not well defined if
pi0 = 0 P-almost surely over (t
∗∗
LH , 1). We adopt the convention that the undefined constraint
is emptily satisfied, which allows us to linearize the constraints (36) and (38). We start with
an existence result.
Lemma A.5 Problems (A.19), (A.16), and (40) have a solution.
Proof. Our convention on the constraints (36) and (38) allows us to rewrite (A.19) as
max{thLE[piL(θ)]− E[θpiL(θ)] : E[θ[1− piL(θ)]] ≥ taLE[1− piL(θ)]
and E[θpiL(θ)] ≥ taHE[piL(θ)]}, (A.20)
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where the maximum is taken over the set
S ≡ {piL ∈ L∞(P) : piL(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and piL(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0, t∗∗LH ]}.
Notice that S is a closed subset of the unit ball BL∞(P) of L∞(P) when the latter set
is endowed with the weak∗ topology σ(L∞(P), L1(P)), which we will henceforth assume
without further mention. By the Banach–Alaoglu compactness theorem (Aliprantis and
Border (2006, Theorem 6.21)), S is thus compact in that topology, and so is by duality the
set S ′ of the functions in S that satisfy the constraints in (A.20); notice furthermore that S ′
is nonempty as it contains
piL(θ) = 1{taH<θ≤taL}1{θ>t∗∗LH}.
Because S ′ is a nonempty compact set and the objective in (A.20) is continuous in piL by
duality, (A.20) and hence (A.19) have a solution.
To complete the proof, observe that, by Lemma A.3, we only need to show that (A.16) has
a solution. Treating t∗∗LH as a parameter, Berge maximum theorem (Aliprantis and Border
(2006, Theorem 17.31)) implies that the solutions to (A.19) as t∗∗LH varies are described by an
upper hemicontinuous correspondence $∗∗L : [0, 1]  BL∞(P) with nonempty compact values.
Thus, by Lemma A.4, (A.16) reduces to maximizing a continuous function of (t∗∗LH , pi
∗∗
L ) over
{(t∗∗LH , pi∗∗L ) : t∗∗LH ∈ [0, 1] and pi∗∗L ∈ $∗∗L (t∗∗LH)}, which is a compact set by the closed graph
theorem (Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.11)). The result follows. 
We are now ready to characterize the solutions to (A.19).
Lemma A.6 Problem (A.19) has a solution of the form (42). If Assumption 2 holds, then
t∗∗L = 1 and, up to a P-null set, any solution to problem (A.19) is of the form (41).
Proof. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 If constraint (38) is slack at the optimum, then (A.19) reduces to finding an
optimal mechanism for type L alone, as described in Section 3. Propositions 1–2 imply that
this mechanism is given by
Π∗∗L (θ) = 1{θ≤t∗L},
so that
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗L}.
Hence we must have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H . We thus fall back on the mechanism (34), which is incentive-
9
compatible if and only the no-externality condition (35) holds.
Case 2 If constraint (38) is binding at the optimum, that is, according to Case 1, if the
no-externality condition (35) does not hold, then
E[θpiL(θ)]
E[piL(θ)]
= taH . (A.21)
Plugging (A.21) into the objective of (A.19), the problem becomes
max{(thL − taH)E[piL(θ)] : pi satisfies (36) and (A.21)}. (A.22)
Our convention on the constraints (36) and (38) allows us to replace expectations in (A.22)
by integrals, yielding the equivalent problem
max
{
(thL − taH)
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
piL(θ)f(θ) dθ :
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ ≥ taL
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ
and
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θpiL(θ)f(θ) dθ = t
a
H
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
piL(θ)f(θ) dθ
}
,
where the maximum is taken over the set S defined in the proof of Lemma A.5. Because S is
convex, and the objective as well as the constraints are affine in piL, this equivalent problem
is convex. Therefore, by the Kuhn–Tucker theorem (Clarke (2013, Theorem 9.4)), for any
solution pi∗∗L to this problem, which is by construction a solution to (A.22) and (A.19), there
exists a vector of Lagrange multipliers (η∗∗, λ∗∗, µ∗∗) such that we have:
• Nontriviality:
(η∗∗, λ∗∗, µ∗∗) 6= (0, 0, 0). (A.23)
• Positivity:
η∗∗ ∈ {0, 1} and λ∗∗ ∈ R+. (A.24)
• Lagrangian maximization:
pi∗∗L ∈ arg max
{∫ 1
t∗∗LH
h∗∗(θ)piL(θ)f(θ) dθ : piL ∈ S
}
, (A.25)
where h∗ is the affine function defined by
h∗∗(θ) ≡ η∗∗(thL − taH) + λ∗∗taL + µ∗∗taH − (λ∗∗ + µ∗∗)θ.
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• Complementary slackness:
λ∗∗
{∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ − taL
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ
}
= 0. (A.26)
• Equality constraint:∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θpi∗∗L (θ)f(θ) dθ = t
a
H
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
pi∗∗L (θ)f(θ) dθ. (A.27)
We distinguish four subcases.
Subcase 2.1 If h∗∗(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (t∗∗LH , 1), then the objective in (A.25) is uniquely
(up to a P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{θ≥t∗∗LH},
which corresponds to a cutoff t∗∗L = 1 in (41). Notice that (A.26) is automatically satisfied
and that (A.27) becomes
E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ] = taH .
Hence we must have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H . That is, type L always consumes and type H is facing his
individually optimal incentive-compatible mechanism.
Subcase 2.2 If h∗∗(θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (t∗∗LH , 1), then the objective in (A.25) is uniquely
(up to a P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 0,
which corresponds to a cutoff t∗∗L = t
∗∗
LH in (41). Notice that (A.27) is automatically satisfied,
and that (A.26) becomes
λ∗∗{E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ]− taL} = 0.
Hence we must have t∗∗LH = t
∗
L if λ
∗∗ > 0. That is, both types are facing the individually
optimal incentive-compatible mechanism for type L.
Subcase 2.3 Suppose that h∗∗ changes sign over (t∗∗LH , 1)—so that we have, in particular,
λ∗∗ + µ∗∗ 6= 0—at
t∗∗L ≡
η∗∗(thL − taH) + λ∗∗taL + µ∗∗taH
λ∗∗ + µ∗∗
.
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We claim that λ∗∗+µ∗∗ > 0. Indeed, if λ∗∗+µ∗∗ < 0, then the objective in (A.25) is uniquely
(up to a P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{θ≥t∗∗L }, (A.28)
so that
pi∗∗0 (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ<t∗∗L }. (A.29)
Now, given (A.29), (36) requires
E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ < t∗∗L ] ≥ taL. (A.30)
However, we know from Lemma A.3 that any solution to (A.16) and, hence, to (A.19) and
(A.22), is also a solution to (40). In particular, given (A.28), (37) requires
E[θ |θ ≥ t∗∗L ] < taL. (A.31)
Because (A.30)–(A.31) contradict each other, we obtain λ∗∗ + µ∗∗ > 0, as claimed, and the
objective in (A.25) is uniquely (up to a P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L },
once again in line with (41).
Subcase 2.4 Suppose finally that h∗∗ is identically zero over (t∗∗LH , 1)—so that we have,
in particular, λ∗∗ + µ∗∗ = 0. Then
η∗∗(thL − taH) + λ∗∗(taL − taH) = 0.
Because taL > t
a
H , we have η
∗∗ = 1 by (A.24); otherwise, by (A.24) again, η∗∗ = λ∗∗ = µ∗∗ = 0,
which violates (A.23). Applying (A.24) yet again, we obtain taH ≥ thL, with equality if and
only if λ∗∗ = 0. By Subcases 2.1–3, this completes the proof in case Assumption 2 holds.
Suppose then that Assumption 2 does not hold, and consider first the case taH > t
h
L. Then
λ∗∗ > 0 and, by (A.26), any solution pi∗∗L to (A.19) must satisfy (A.27) and∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ = taL
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ. (A.32)
Notice that, because Lemma A.5 guarantees that a solution pi∗∗L to (A.19) exists, there exists
a solution to (A.27) and (A.32). Conversely, because h∗∗ is identically zero over (t∗∗LH , 1),
any solution to (A.27) and (A.32) is a solution to the maximization condition (A.25) and
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hence to (A.19) as this is a convex problem and η∗∗ > 0 (Clarke (2013, Exercise 9.7)). Let
us then fix a solution pi∗∗L to (A.27) and (A.32). We focus with no loss of generality on the
case where pi∗∗L is not equal to 1 or to 0, P-almost surely over (t
∗∗
LH , 1); otherwise, we are
back to Subcases 2.1 or 2.2 as above. That is, we focus on the case where both constraints
(36) and (38) in (A.16) are well defined and binding. In particular, we must have
t∗∗LH < t
a
H < E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ] < taL. (A.33)
Summing (A.27) and (A.32) and rearranging, we obtain that any solution to (A.27) and
(A.32) satisfies∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ = ρ ≡
E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ]− taH
taL − taH
[1− F (t∗∗LH)] < 1− F (t∗∗LH). (A.34)
We claim that, in line with (42), there exists a solution to (A.27) and (A.32) of the form
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L } + 1{θ>t∗∗L }
for some cutoffs t∗∗L > t
∗∗
L > t
∗∗
LH . To prove this claim, we show that the system in (t, t)∫ t
t
θf(θ) dθ = taL[F (t)− F (t)] (A.35)∫ t
t∗∗LH
θf(θ) dθ +
∫ 1
t
θf(θ) dθ = taH [F (t)− F (t∗∗LH) + 1− F (t)], (A.36)
has a unique solution. As above, summing (A.35)–(A.36) yields
F (t)− F (t) = ρ, (A.37)
and hence (A.35) rewrites as
ψ(t) ≡
∫ F−1(F (t)+ρ)
t
θf(θ) dθ
ρ
= E[θ | t < θ ≤ F−1(F (t) + ρ)] = taL,
which we must solve for t ∈ (t∗∗LH , F−1(1− ρ)]. By the intermediate value theorem, we only
need to check that ψ(t∗∗LH) < t
a
L, that ψ is strictly increasing over (t
∗∗
LH , F
−1(1− ρ)], and that
ψ(F−1(1− ρ)) ≥ taL. The first statement follows from
ψ(t∗∗LH) = E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ ≤ F−1(F (t∗∗LH) + ρ)] < E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ] < taL,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that F (t∗∗LH)+ρ < 1 by (A.37) and that P has
full support over [0, 1], and the second inequality follows from (A.33). The second statement
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follows from a straightforward computation,
ψ′(t) =
f(t)[F−1(F (t) + ρ)− t]
ρ
> 0.
The third statement amounts to∫ 1
F−1(1−ρ) θf(θ) dθ
ρ
≥ taL. (A.38)
But we know that there exists a solution to (A.27) and (A.32), which satisfies
taL =
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ
=
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ
ρ
by (A.34), and clearly∫ 1
F−1(1−ρ)
θf(θ) dθ = max
{∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ :
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ = ρ
}
,
which yields the desired inequality (A.38). The claim follows. In case (A.38) holds as an
equality, we have t∗∗L = 1, and pi
∗∗
L has the same form as in Subcase 2.3.
The proof for the limiting case taH = t
h
L or, equivalently, βH = β˜H(βL), relies on a simple
continuity argument. From the proof of Lemma A.5, for each βH ≥ β˜H(βL), any solution to
(A.16) for βH can be represented by a pair (t
∗∗
LH(βH), pi
∗∗
L (βH)) ∈ [0, 1]×BL∞(P). Consider a
strictly decreasing sequence (βH,n)n∈N converging to β˜H(βL). By Berge maximum theorem
(Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.31)) along with the fact that BL∞(P) is metrizable
as L1(P) is separable (Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorems 6.30 and 13.16)), any sequence
((t∗∗LH(βH,n), pi
∗∗
L (βH,n)))n∈N of solutions to (A.16) for each term of the sequence (βH,n)n∈N has
a subsequence that converges in [0, 1]×BL∞(P) to a solution (t∗∗LH(β˜H(βL)), pi∗∗L (β˜H(βL))) to
(A.16) for β˜H(βL). We can with no loss of generality assume that this sequence converges.
For each n ∈ N, we have βH,n > β˜H(βL) and hence
pi∗∗L (βH,n)(θ) = 1{t∗∗LH(βH,n)<θ≤t∗∗L (βH,n)} (A.39)
by Subcases 2.1–3. Therefore,∫
pi∗∗L (β˜H(βL))(θ) P(dθ) = lim
n→∞
∫
pi∗∗L (βH,n)(θ) P(dθ)
= lim
n→∞
F (t∗∗L (βH,n))− F (t∗∗LH(βH,n))
= lim
n→∞
F (t∗∗L (βH,n))− F (t∗∗LH(β˜H(βL))), (A.40)
where the first equality follows from the fact that the sequence (pi∗∗L (βH,n))n∈N converges
to pi∗∗L (β˜H(βL)) in BL∞(P), using the definition of the weak
∗ topology σ(L∞(P), L1(P)), the
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second equality follows from (A.39), and the third inequality follows from the fact that the
sequence (t∗∗LH(βH,n))n∈N converges to t
∗∗
LH(β˜H(βL)) in [0, 1] and that F is continuous as P is
nonatomic. Because F is strictly increasing as P has full support, (A.40) implies that the
sequence (t∗∗L (βH,n))n∈N converges to some limit t∞. To complete the proof, notice that, for
any Borel subset A of [0, 1],∫
A
pi∗∗L (β˜H(βL))(θ) P(dθ) = lim
n→∞
∫
A
pi∗∗L (βH,n)(θ) P(dθ)
= lim
n→∞
P[A ∩ (t∗∗LH(βH,n), t∗∗L (βH,n)]], (A.41)
using again the definition of the weak∗ topology σ(L∞(P), L1(P)) along with (A.39). Finally,
we can substitute A = (t∗∗LH(β˜H(βL), t∞] and A = (t∞, 1] in (A.41) and use the fact that the
sequence ((t∗∗LH(βH,n), t
∗∗
L (βH,n)))n∈N converges to (t
∗∗
LH(β˜H(βL), t∞) to conclude that in fact
t∞ = t∗∗L (β˜H(βL)) and
pi∗∗L (β˜H(βL))(θ) = 1{t∗∗LH(β˜H(βL))<θ≤t∗∗L (β˜H(βL))}
up to a P-null set. The result follows. 
Proposition 4 is then an immediate consequence of Lemma A.6. Hence the result. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We solve (A.16) for the optimal cutoffs (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L )—the existence of
which we established in Proposition 4—under the assumption that the individually optimal
mechanisms with cutoffs (t∗H , t
∗
L) are not simultaneously implementable. We first claim that
we can restrict attention to cutoffs (tLH , tL) such that tL ≥ t∗L. We distinguish two cases. If
t∗L > t
h
L, then (36) is satisfied if and only if tL ≥ t∗L. If t∗L = thL, then, for any given tLH , any
cutoff tL < t
h
L would induce an inefficiently high rate of abstinence for type L and would
tighten (38) compared to tL = t
h
L; hence an optimal cutoff tL must satisfy tL ≥ thL, which
is incentive compatible as thL = t
∗
L. The claim follows. Replacing expectations in (A.16) by
integrals then yields the equivalent problem
max
{
pLβL
∫ tL
0
(thL − θ)f(θ) dθ + pHβH
∫ tLH
0
(thH − θ)f(θ) dθ
}
, (A.42)
subject to the constraints ∫ tL
tLH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ ≥ 0, (A.43)
tL − t∗L ≥ 0, (A.44)
1− tL ≥ 0. (A.45)
The objective in (A.42) is continuous in (tLH , tL) and the feasible set defined by (tLH , tL) ∈
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[0, 1]2 and (A.43)–(A.45) is compact. Hence problem (A.42)–(A.45) has a solution (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ).
The proof consists of four steps.
Step 1 We first show that t∗∗L > t
a
H > t
∗∗
LH ≥ thH in any solution (t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) to (A.42)–(A.45).
That t∗∗L > t
a
H follows from our preliminary observation that tL ≥ thL along with Assumption
2. As for t∗∗LH , suppose, by way of contradiction, that t
∗∗
LH ≥ taH . Because t∗∗L > taH , we have∫ t∗∗L
taH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ > 0.
Hence lowering t∗∗LH to a value t
a
H−ε for some small ε > 0 would preserve (A.43) and strictly
increase the objective in (A.42), a contradiction. Thus taH > t
∗∗
LH , as claimed. The proof
that t∗∗LH ≥ thH is similar, observing that the left-hand side of (A.43) is strictly increasing in
tLH ∈ [0, taH ] and the objective in (A.42) is strictly increasing in tLH ∈ [0, thH ].
Step 2 We next verify that constraints (A.43)–(A.45) satisfy the Mangasarian–Fromovitz
qualification conditions at (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) (Mangasarian (1969, 11.3.5)). Letting g be the mapping
defined by the left-hand sides of the binding constraints at (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ), we must prove that
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L )zT > 0 has a solution z ∈ R2, where ∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) is the Jacobian matrix of g at
(t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ). This is obvious if (A.43) is not binding. If (A.43) is binding, then the first line of
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) is
Dg1(t
∗∗
LH , t
∗∗
L ) ≡
(
(taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L )
)
.
We shall exploit the fact that f is strictly positive over (0, 1). Notice first that, because
taH > t
∗∗
LH ≥ thH by Step 1, we always have (taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) > 0. If only (A.43) is binding,
then 1 > t∗∗L > t
a
H by Step 1, so that (t
∗
L − taH)f(t∗∗L ) > 0 and
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) = Dg1(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ).
We can then take any z ∈ R2++. Next, if (A.43) and (A.44) are binding, then t∗∗L = t∗L, so
that (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L ) > 0 and
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) =
(
(taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L )
0 1
)
.
We can then take any z ∈ R2++. Finally, if (A.43) and (A.45) are binding, then it is optimal
to have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H by Propositions 1–2, and
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) =
(
(taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L )
0 −1
)
.
We can then take z = (1, ε) for some small enough ε < 0.
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Step 3 According to Step 1, constraints (A.43)–(A.45) are qualified at any solution
(t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) to (A.42)–(A.45). Therefore, by the Kuhn–Tucker necessary optimality conditions
for nonconvex optimization problems (Mangasarian (1969, 11.3.6)), there exists a vector of
Lagrange multipliers (ζ∗∗, ν∗∗, χ∗∗) such that we have:
• Positivity:
(ζ∗∗, ν∗∗, χ∗∗) ∈ R3+. (A.46)
• First-order conditions:
pLβL(t
h
L − t∗∗L )f(t∗∗L ) + ζ∗∗(t∗∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L ) + ν∗∗ − χ∗∗ = 0, (A.47)
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH)− ζ∗∗(t∗∗LH − taH)f(t∗∗LH) = 0. (A.48)
• Complementary slackness:
ζ∗∗
∫ t∗∗L
t∗∗LH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0, (A.49)
ν∗∗(t∗∗L − t∗L) = 0, (A.50)
χ∗∗(1− t∗∗L ) = 0. (A.51)
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1 Suppose first that (A.44) is binding, so that t∗∗L = t
∗
L and χ
∗∗ = 0 by (A.51), and
suppose further, by way of contradiction, that ζ∗∗ = 0. Then, by (A.48) along with the fact
that f(t∗∗LH) > 0 as t
a
H > t
∗∗
LH ≥ thH by Step 1 and f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we must
have t∗∗LH = t
h
H . Therefore, using the assumption that the individually optimal mechanisms
with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, we obtain that
E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ ≤ t∗L] ≤ E[θ | t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] < taH .
But then (A.43) is violated at (t∗∗LH , t
∗
L), a contradiction. Hence, by (A.46), ζ
∗∗ > 0, so that,
by (A.49), (A.43) must be binding at (t∗∗LH , t
∗
L). That is, t
∗∗
LH must satisfy∫ t∗L
t∗∗LH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0. (A.52)
Because f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we have f(t∗L) > 0; moreover, as argued above,
f(t∗∗LH) > 0. Because χ
∗∗ = 0 ≤ ν∗∗ by (A.46), the first-order conditions (A.47)–(A.48)
rewrite as
pLβL(t
h
L − t∗L) + ζ∗∗(t∗L − taH) ≤ 0, (A.53)
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pHβH(t
h
H − t∗∗LH)− ζ∗∗(t∗∗LH − taH) = 0. (A.54)
Because ζ∗∗ > 0 and t∗L ≥ thL > taH , (A.53) implies t∗L > thL. Hence the bracketed terms
in (A.53) are different from zero. Moreover, because the bracketed terms in (A.54) cannot
simultaneously be zero, none of them can be zero. We can thus divide (A.54) by (A.53),
which yields
pHβH
pLβL
t∗∗LH − thH
t∗L − thL
≤ t
a
H − t∗∗LH
t∗L − taH
. (A.55)
Case 2 Suppose next that (A.45) is binding, so that t∗∗L = 1 and ν
∗∗ = 0 by (A.50). By
Propositions 1–2, it is then optimal to have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H . Because f is strictly positive over
(0, 1), we have f(t∗H) > 0. The first-order condition (A.48) then rewrites as
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗H)− ζ∗∗(t∗H − taH) = 0, (A.56)
so that t∗H > t
h
H if and only if ζ
∗∗ > 0. If f(1) > 0, then, because χ∗∗ ≥ 0 = ν∗∗ by (A.46),
we can also simplify (A.47) to obtain
pLβL(t
h
L − 1) + ζ∗∗(1− taH) ≥ 0. (A.57)
The argument leading to (A.57) is a bit more involved if f(1) = 0. In that case, it follows
from (A.47) and ν∗∗ = 0 that χ∗∗ = 0 as well. Hence the relevant part of the Lagrangian, to
be maximized with respect to tL, can be written as∫ tL
t∗H
[pLβL(t
h
L − θ) + ζ∗∗(θ − taH)]f(θ) dθ,
which, as f is strictly positive over (0, 1), is maximum for tL = 1 only if (A.57) holds. By
(A.46) and (A.57), ζ∗∗ > 0, so that, by (A.49), (A.43) must be binding at (t∗H , 1). That is,
t∗H must satisfy ∫ 1
t∗H
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0, (A.58)
which generically implies that t∗H > t
h
H , so that the unconstrained-optimal mechanism for
type H is not incentive-compatible. The terms t∗H − taH and 1− taH in (A.56)–(A.57) are by
construction different from zero. We can thus divide (A.56) by (A.57), which yields
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
≥ t
a
H − t∗H
1− taH
. (A.59)
Case 3 Suppose finally that (A.44)–(A.45) are not binding, so that ν∗∗ = χ∗∗ = 0 by
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(A.50)–(A.51). As f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we have f(t∗∗L ) > 0 and, as argued in
Case 1, f(t∗∗LH) > 0. The first-order conditions (A.47)–(A.48) then rewrite as
pLβL(t
h
L − t∗∗L ) + ζ∗∗(t∗∗L − taH) = 0, (A.60)
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗∗LH)− ζ∗∗(t∗∗LH − taH) = 0. (A.61)
We must have ζ∗∗ > 0, and hence, by (A.49), (A.43) must be binding, for, otherwise, the
individually unconstrained-optimal mechanisms for types H and L would be simultaneously
implementable. That is, (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) must satisfy∫ t∗∗L
t∗∗LH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0. (A.62)
Because, as a result, the terms on the left- and the right-hand sides in each of (A.60)–(A.61)
cannot simultaneously be zero, none of them can be zero. Dividing yields
pHβH
pLβL
t∗∗LH − thH
t∗∗L − thL
=
taH − t∗∗LH
t∗∗L − taH
. (A.63)
Step 4 To complete the proof, we only need to delineate the circumstances under which
each of the cases discussed in Step 3 arises. In each case, (A.43) is binding, see (A.52),
(A.58), and (A.62). Let accordingly
TL ≡ {tL ≥ t∗L : there exists tH ≤ tL such that E[θ | tH < θ ≤ tL] = taH}. (A.64)
Because t∗L > t
a
H and E[θ | t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] < taH as the individually optimal mechanisms with
cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, t
∗
L ∈ TL. Because E[θ | tH < θ ≤ tL]
is strictly increasing in tH and tL, TL is thus an interval [t∗L, sup TL], and there exists a unique
strictly decreasing function tˆLH : TL → [0, taH) implicitly defined by
E[θ | tˆLH(tL) < θ ≤ tL] = taH . (A.65)
By (A.52), (A.58), and (A.62), given t∗∗L , t
∗∗
LH is uniquely pinned down by
t∗∗LH = tˆLH(t
∗∗
L ). (A.66)
As f is strictly positive over (0, 1), a straightforward application of the implicit function
theorem implies that tˆLH is differentiable over the interior of TL, with
tˆ′LH(tL) = −
f(tL)
f(tˆLH(tL))
tL − E[θ | tˆLH(tL) < θ ≤ tL]
E[θ | tˆLH(tL) < θ ≤ tL]− tˆLH(tL)
< 0. (A.67)
While (A.66) holds in each of Cases 1, 2, and 3, these cases differ as to whether (A.55),
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(A.70), or (A.63) holds. Defining accordingly
κ(tL) ≡ pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(tL)− thH
tL − thL
− t
a
H − tˆLH(tL)
tL − taH
, (A.68)
we have κ(t∗L) ≤ 0, κ(1) ≥ 0, and κ(t∗∗L ) = 0 in Cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. To conclude,
we only need to show that these cases are mutually exclusive. For this, we only need to show
that κ single-crosses zero, from above. Indeed, if κ(tL) = 0, then
κ′(tL) =
pHβH
pLβL
[
tˆ′LH(tL)
tL − thL
− tˆLH(tL)− t
h
H
(tL − thL)2
]
+
tˆ′LH(tL)
tL − taH
+
taH − tˆLH(tL)
(tL − taH)2
< − pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(tL)− thH
(tL − thL)2
+
taH − tˆLH(tL)
(tL − taH)2
=
[taH − tˆLH(tL)](taH − thL)
(tL − thL)(tL − taH)2
< 0, (A.69)
where the first inequality follows from (A.67), the second equality follows from (A.68) along
with κ(tL) = 0, and the second inequality follows from Assumption 2. Thus Case 1 occurs if
and only if κ(t∗L) ≤ 0, so that κ(tL) < 0 for all tL > t∗L, Case 2 occurs if and only if κ(1) ≥ 0,
so that κ(tL) > 0 for all tL < 1, and Case 3 occurs if and only if κ(t
∗
L) > 0 and κ(1) < 0, so
that κ(tL) changes sign from positive to negative only at tL = t
∗∗
L . The result follows. 
Proof of Corollary 5. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1 Consider first the boundary p, starting with the case t∗L > t
h
L. Define the function
tˆLH as in (A.65). By Assumption 2, t
∗
L > t
a
H , and, by construction, tˆLH(t
∗
L) < t
a
H . Moreover,
because the individually optimal mechanisms with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously
implementable, tˆLH(t
∗
L) > t
∗
H and thus tˆLH(t
∗
L) > t
h
H . Hence
βH
βL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
> 0 and
taH − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
> 0.
As p 7→ p/(1−p) is a strictly increasing continuous mapping between (0, 1) and (0,∞), there
exists a unique p ∈ (0, 1) such that
pβH
(1− p)βL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
=
taH − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
,
so that
pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
≤ t
a
H − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
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if and only if pH ∈ [0, p]. Defining κ as in (A.68), we thus have κ(t∗L) ≤ 0 for any such pH .
It then follows from Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 3 that (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) = (tˆLH(t
∗
L), t
∗
L). We have
thus proven that, if t∗L > t
h
L, there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all pH ∈ (0, p], type L faces
his individually optimal incentive-compatible mechanism. To complete the proof, we only
need to check that if t∗L = t
h
L and type L faces his individually optimal incentive-compatible
mechanism, so that t∗∗L = t
∗
L = t
h
L, then it must be that pH = 0, in which case we can set
p ≡ 0 by convention. Indeed, from (A.53) in Case 1 of the proof of Lemma 3, if we impose
the constraint (A.43), which is relevant only if pH > 0, then ζ
∗∗ > 0, and t∗∗L = t
∗
L implies
t∗L > t
h
L. Thus t
∗∗
L = t
∗
L = t
h
L implies pH = 0, as desired.
Step 2 Consider next the boundary p, starting with the case t∗H > t
h
H . Then
βH
βL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
> 0 and
taH − t∗H
1− taH
> 0.
As p 7→ p/(1−p) is a strictly increasing continuous mapping between (0, 1) and (0,∞), there
exists a unique p ∈ (0, 1) such that
pβH
(1− p)βL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
=
taH − t∗H
1− taH
,
so that
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
≥ t
a
H − t∗H
1− taH
if and only if pH ∈ [p, 1]. Defining κ as in (A.68), we thus have κ(1) ≥ 0 for any such pH .
It then follows from Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 3 that (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) = (t
∗
H , 1). We have thus
proven that, if t∗H > t
h
H , there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all pH ∈ [p, 1), type H faces
his individually optimal incentive-compatible mechanism. To complete the proof, we only
need to check that if t∗H = t
h
H and type H faces his individually optimal incentive-compatible
mechanism, so that t∗∗LH = t
∗
H = t
h
H , then it must be that pH = 1, in which case we can
set p ≡ 1 by convention. Indeed, from (A.56) in Case 2 of the proof of Lemma 3, t∗H = thH
implies ζ∗∗ = 0. Because t∗∗LH = t
∗
H implies t
∗∗
L = 1, (A.57) implies pL = 0, as desired.
Step 3 According to Steps 1–2,
pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
>
taH − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
and
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
<
taH − t∗H
1− taH
if and only if pH ∈ (p, p). Defining κ as in (A.68), we thus have
κ(pH , t
∗∗
L ) =
pHβH
(1− pH)βL
tˆLH(t
∗∗
L )− thH
t∗∗L − thL
− t
a
H − tˆLH(t∗∗L )
t∗∗L − taH
= 0 (A.70)
21
for any such pH , where we make the dependence of κ on pH explicit. It then follows from Step
4 of the proof of Lemma 3 that (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) is the unique solution to (44). Let us accordingly
denote by tˆL(pH) the unique solution to (A.70). We clearly have (∂κ/∂pH)(pH , tL) > 0
and, from (A.69), (∂κ/∂pH)(pH , tL) < 0 if κ(pH , tL) = 0. A straightforward application of
the implicit function theorem then implies that tˆL is differentiable over (p, p), with tˆ
′
L > 0.
Summarizing, because
(t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) = (tˆLH(tˆL(pH)), tˆL(pH))
for all pH ∈ (p, p), where tˆLH is strictly decreasing over TL by (A.67), the probabilities of
consumption F (tˆLH(tˆL(pH))) and F (tˆL(pH)) of type H and type L are strictly decreasing
and strictly increasing in pH ∈ (p, p), respectively. Hence the result. .
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